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ABSTRACT
This paper revisits the empirical evidence on the relationship between economic integration and
economic growth. First, we present an updated dataset of openness indicators and trade liberalization
dates for a wide cross-section of countries in the 1990s. Second, we extend the Sachs and Warner
(1995) study of the relationship between trade openness and economic growth to the 1990s,
discussing recent criticisms of their measurement and estimation framework. Our results suggest that
the cross-sectional findings of Sachs and Warner are sensitive to the period under consideration. In
particular, an updated version of their dichotomous trade policy openness indicator does not enter
significantly in growth regressions for the 1990s. Third, and most importantly, we present new
evidence on the time paths of economic growth, physical capital investment and openness around
episodes of trade policy liberalization. In sharp contrast to our cross-sectional results, we find that
liberalization has, on average, robust positive effects on growth, openness and investment rates
within countries. We illustrate these large sample findings with detailed case studies in a subsample
of representative countries.
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In recent decades, many developing countries have embarked on programs of external economic
liberalization. Figure 1 shows that, in 1960, 15.6% of the countries in the world, representing 19%
of its population, had open trade policies, in the sense deﬁned by Sachs and Warner (1995). In
2000, a total of 73% of the countries in the world, representing 47% of the world population, were
open to international trade.1
The eﬀect of this trend towards greater trade policy openness on per capita income growth is
the topic of a large body of research. Until recently, a growing academic consensus had emerged
that both trade policy openness and higher ratios of trade volumes to GDP were positively cor-
related with growth, even after controlling for a variety of other growth determinants. Attempts
to establish a causal link also suggested a positive impact of trade.2 In a sweeping critical survey
of this literature, Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000) have suggested that these ﬁndings are less robust
than claimed, due to diﬃculties in measuring openness, statistically sensitive speciﬁcations, the
collinearity of protectionist policies with other bad policies and other econometric diﬃculties. Be-
cause of the doubts that this study has created about the linkages between trade openness and
growth, further research on this important topic is certainly called for.3
This paper takes over where Rodríguez and Rodrik left oﬀ. We pursue three goals. The ﬁrst
goal is to present an updated dataset on trade liberalization status and trade liberalization dates.
While recent research has pointed to serious problems with the Sachs and Warner (henceforth, SW)
1The main reason for the discrepancy between the share of countries that are open and the share of world population
living in open countries is that as of 2000, the world’s two largest countries, China and India, remained essentially
closed. Sachs and Warner (1995) classify India as open as of 1994. We revisited this issue and could not conﬁrm
their ﬁnding. In fact, China appears on many accounts to be twice as open, both in terms of policy indicators and in
terms of trade volumes, than India. Both countries, according to our updated dates of openness, remained closed as
of 2000. We discuss these case in detail below and in Appendix 2. For an in depth comparison of the trade regimes
of India and China, see also Wacziarg (2003).
2Among this huge literature, note in particular the contributions of Edwards (1992), Dollar (1992), Ben David
(1993), Sachs and Warner (1995), Ades and Glaeser (1999), and Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000). Among
s t u d i e st r y i n gt oe s t a b l i s hac a u s a ll i n kr u n n i n gf r o mo p e nness to growth or income levels, see Frankel and Romer
(1999) where openness is measured by trade volumes and Wacziarg (2001), where openness is captured by a composite
trade policy index.
3Harrison and Hanson (1999) also criticized the Sachs and Warner classiﬁcation, in a spirit similar to that of
Rodríguez and Rodrik. We revisit these criticisms in detail below.
1classiﬁcation, their classiﬁcation of open and closed countries remains widely used in the literature
on trade and growth, so an update is called for. Moreover, the underlying data on tariﬀs, nontariﬀ
barriers, exchange rate black market premia, socialist economic systems and export marketing
boards can be of independent interest, and we provide a comprehensive database of these variables
for the 1990s. We have painstakingly checked the Sachs and Warner classiﬁcation of openness
and updated their data on trade policy openness to 2000. The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is
therefore to present a comprehensive cross-country database of trade indicators such as tariﬀs, non
tariﬀ barriers and other measures of trade restrictions as well as policy liberalization dates for the
1990s.
The recent publication of updated PPP data on income levels (Summers, Heston and Aten,
2001) allows us to use these new data to update the Sachs and Warner empirical ﬁndings on trade
policy and growth to 1998, and to revisit the Rodríguez and Rodrik (henceforth, RR) critique of
this study. The second contribution of this paper is therefore to extend SW’s empirical results on
outward orientation and growth to the 1990s.
The third and most important goal of this paper is to exploit the timing of liberalization in
a within-country setting. With almost ﬁfty years of data, it becomes feasible to compare the
performance of countries under a liberalized versus a non liberalized regime. We estimate the
within-country response of per capita income growth, the investment rate and the ratio of imports
plus exports to GDP to trade liberalization, controlling for time invariant country characteristics.
Thus, the third contribution of this paper is to shift focus away from estimating the cross-sectional
relationship between openness and growth, and to present new evidence on the within-country
path of growth in relation to the date of major trade policy changes. The large sample evidence
is supplemented by a case study discussion of the experience of several developing countries with
trade reform.
Our cross-sectional results conﬁrm recent criticisms of the SW ﬁndings by showing that they
were sensitive to the chosen openness classiﬁcation in the 1970-1989 period, and that they no longer
hold for the 1990s. In the 1990s, a vast majority of the countries in our sample are classiﬁed as
open, and a simple dichotomous indicator of openness no longer discriminates between slow and
fast growing countries. Our ﬁndings suggest that researchers should exercise caution when using
simple dichotomous policy indicators such as the SW dummy. However, we argue that the dates of
trade liberalization, collected by SW from a comprehensive survey of a broad country-speciﬁcc a s e
2literature and updated by us to the late 1990s, can be used to estimate the within-country growth
and investment eﬀects of trade policy liberalization. In contrast to our cross-sectional ﬁndings, these
new results based on within-country variation suggest that the eﬀects of increased policy openness
within countries through time are positive, economically large and statistically signiﬁcant.
We then examine a subsample of developing countries for which we collected detailed information
on the broader economic and political context of trade reform, and interpret our large sample results
in the context of these country case studies. This reveals two lessons. First, there is a vast amount
of heterogeneity across countries in the extent to which growth rose after trade reforms. While the
average eﬀect obtained in the large sample is positive, roughly half of the countries experienced zero
or even negative changes in growth post-liberalization. Second, generalizations about the factors
that may explain these diﬀerences are diﬃcult to draw. The preexisting institutional environment
of countries, the extent of political turmoil, the scope and depth of economic reforms, and the
characteristics of concurrent macroeconomic policies all seem to have a role to play.
Our paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we present our updated dataset of liberalization
dates and policy openness indicators. In Section 3, we replicate the growth regressions in SW and
update them to the 1990s. In Section 4, we present within-country evidence on trade liberalization,
growth, investment and trade volumes, and discuss the timing of these eﬀects. Section 5 discusses
several detailed cases of trade liberalization in order to illustrate the country-speciﬁcc o m p l e x i t i e s
that underlie our large sample results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Trade Liberalization in the 1990s
2.1 The Sachs and Warner Criteria
SW constructed a dummy variable for openness based on ﬁve individual dummies for speciﬁc
trade-related policies. A country was classiﬁed as closed if it displayed at least one of the following
characteristics:
1. Average tariﬀ rates of 40% of more (TAR);
2. Nontariﬀ barriers covering 40% or more of trade (NTB);
3. A black market exchange rate that is depreciated by 20% or more relative to the oﬃcial exchange
rate, on average, during the 1970s or 1980s (BMP);
4. A state monopoly on major exports (XMB);
35. A socialist economic system (as deﬁned by Kornai, 1992) (SOC).
SW selected the ﬁve criteria in order to cover various types of trade restrictions. They noted
the obvious role of tariﬀ and nontariﬀ barriers in restricting trade. They argued that the existence
of a black market premium on the exchange rate could have eﬀects equivalent to a formal trade re-
striction. For example, if exporters have to purchase foreign inputs using foreign currency obtained
on the black market, but remit their foreign exchange receipts from exports to the government
at the oﬃcial exchange rate, the black market premium acts as a trade restriction. Arguing on
the basis of Lerner symmetry between import tariﬀs and export taxes, SW also included the state
monopoly on exports criterion as a trade restriction. Finally, the socialist regime dummy variable
was included in order to account for the trade-limiting aspects of centrally-planned economies.
It is important to distinguish the SW dummy variable, which pertains to the 1970s and 1980s,
from the SW liberalization dates, which extend from 1950 to 1994 and were compiled independently
using a rather diﬀerent methodology. While the SW dummy was based on the ﬁve criteria discussed
above, the dates of liberalization were obtained from a comprehensive survey of country case studies
of liberalization. Whenever possible, the same criteria as those used to construct the cross-sectional
dummy for the 1970s and 1980s were employed to establish a country’s date of liberalization.
However, data limitations and lack of consistency in the deﬁnitions of the available measures of trade
restrictions across diﬀerent time periods prevented SW from using their ﬁve criteria to establish the
dates of liberalization.4 In our update, we followed as closely as possible the methodology initially
used by SW.
2.2 An Openness Dummy for the 1990s
2.2.1 Methodology
Our sample is based on the 118 countries included in the SW dataset, although they characterized
the 1970-1989 openness status of only 111 of these. In addition, we gathered new data for the 23
Eastern European and newly independent states of the former Soviet Union that are included in
the recently released Version 6 of the Penn World Tables (Summers, Heston, and Aten (2001)). In
4This is clearly stated in their footnote 44 (p.24): “Our choice of dating is surely subject to further reﬁnement.
(...) We relied on a wide array of secondary sources, which sometimes contradicted each other”. Their Appendix
described how they complied their dates of liberalization and the corresponding data sources in detail for each country
in their sample.
4order to maintain as much consistency as possible between the SW dataset and our update, we
constructed our openness dummy variable (OPEN90-99) in the same way as theirs. Therefore, as
was the case in SW, we constructed the dummy based on the ﬁve criteria described above. However,
there were data limitations preventing us from updating their dummy to the 1990s decade based
on exactly the same data. Our data sources are detailed in Appendix 1.5 We merely describe the
main diﬀerences here:
1). Due to data availability problems, we used unweighted tariﬀ data, while SW used own-import
weighted data. The unweighted average captures the simple average of ad valorem r a t e sa c r o s st a r i ﬀ
lines, while the weighted average is weighted by product shares in a country’s overall imports. It is
important to note this inconsistency between our dataset and the SW dataset, since countries that
exceed the TAR threshold in our dataset based on unweighted data could conceivably not exceed
the threshold based on weighted average data. Using partial data on weighted and unweighted
tariﬀs from the World Bank, we argue in Appendix 1 that this is unlikely to be a problem: the
use of unweighted tariﬀs as opposed to weighted tariﬀs does not result in countries being classiﬁed
diﬀerently.
2). Nontariﬀ barrier data comparable to that used by SW are hard to come by. They used
average NTB data for 1985-1988 from the Barro-Lee dataset, itself based on UNCTAD data. Our
NTB data covers only 29 countries, for the period 1995-1998. Whenever comparable data on NTBs
was missing, we had no choice but to classify the countries based on the other four SW criteria only.
Due to the limited availability of 1990s NTB data based on a consistent deﬁnition, we compiled
additional NTB data, which might be independently useful to researchers. In addition to the 1995-
1998 average core NTB data used in our analysis, our dataset contains 1989-1994 average core NTB
data and 1999 data for all NTBs.6
3). SW relied on an export marketing index from a World Bank (1994) study of African
countries as the basis for their XMB variables, and on the Kornai classiﬁcation of Socialist states
5The full dataset compiled for this paper is available in electronic format at
http://www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/papersum.html. Appendix 2-A displays the data necessary to construct
the updated 1990-1999 openness indicator.
6The diﬀerence in the deﬁnitions reﬂects the change in UNCTAD’s reporting that occurred in 1999. Prior to 1999,
UNCTAD reported core nontariﬀ barrier frequency, which includes quotas, licensing, prohibitions, and administered
pricing. In 1999, it began reporting all NTBs, which also include technical measures and automatic licensing, in
addition to core NTBs.
5as the basis for their SOC dummy. In the absence of updated indices from single sources, we could
not employ exactly the same methodology. Therefore, in our classiﬁcation the XMB and SOC
dummies were both obtained from a comprehensive review of country case studies. In particular,
the XMB criterion is no longer conﬁned to African countries (as it was in SW), but applies to
all countries in our updated data. We expanded the deﬁnition of an export marketing board to
encompass any form of state monopoly over major exports.7
4). We lack data on the black market premium for several countries, as explained in detail in
Appendix 1. BMP data from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002), our primary source for updating BMP
data, is missing in the case of Belarus, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. We have very limited data for
ﬁve other CIS countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova). All are
classiﬁed as open based on the overall index that includes only this limited BMP data. In the case
the former USSR states for which we do have BMP data, they are all closed on the basis of their
BMP, with the exception of Latvia and Lithuania.
5). SW deviated in some cases from their self-imposed classiﬁcation rules (as detailed on p.
66-67 of their paper). Some adjustments were meant to capture the fact that some countries
had undergone changes in trade policy in mid-period only, so that a classiﬁcation based on period
averages could be misleading, while other adjustments were made, as the authors write, “for diﬀerent
reasons”, detailed in their paper. Since we lack objective reasons to deviate from stated rules, we
abstained from any such adjustments for the 1990-1999 openness dummy variable.
2.2.2 The Data
Appendix 2-A displays the underlying data used to construct the openness status dummy variable
for the period 1990-1999. There are several noteworthy features of our data, highlighted in Tables
1 to 3. First, 46 countries, listed in Table 1, were classiﬁed as closed by SW in the 1970-1989 period
and are now open in the 1990-1999 decade. Of these, 9 countries were still classiﬁed as closed by
SW as of 1994 based on their dates of liberalization. Second, Table 2 lists 30 countries that were
not classiﬁed in SW’s study, including 23 Eastern European and former Soviet states.8 10 of them
7See Appendix 3 for further details on export marketing boards and political transitions from socialism along with
their country-speciﬁcs o u r c e s .
8The other 7 countries were Liberia, Cape Verde, Iceland, Lesotho, Malta, Panama, and Swaziland. On p. 66-67
of their study, SW state that these and 4 other countries were not classiﬁed due to lack of data. The 4 other countries
they mention but neither list nor classify were Comoros, Fiji, Seychelles and Suriname. We did not have the necessary
6remained closed in the 1990-1999 decade. Finally, of the 111 countries that SW had classiﬁed, 78
were closed and 33 were open in the 1970-1989 period, and we found that 32 were closed and 79
were open in the 1990-1999 period. Of the 141 countries that we classiﬁed, we found that 42 were
closed over the 1990-99 decade, while 99 were open. There were no countries that were classiﬁed
as open by SW in 1970-1989 and as closed according to our update in the 1990-1999 period.
An important and often overlooked drawback of the SW openness dummy variable is that it was
based on averages of black market premium (BMP) data over each of two decades (1970—79 and
1980-89), averages of nontariﬀ barriers (NTB) and tariﬀs( T A R )o v e rt h elast years of their sample
period (1985-1988) and on end-of-period data for the export marketing board dummy (XMB) and
the socialist dummy (SOC). We chose to base the XMB and SOC variables on their 1999 values
as opposed to beginning-of-period or decade-long data, in order to maintain as much consistency
as possible with the SW methodology.9 Similarly, our NTB data is available only for 1995-1998
(we do use decade averages of the tariﬀ data, since they are available). As a result, some countries
classiﬁed as closed could conceivably have become open late in the decade, and some open countries
could have been closed over most of the period. Thus, decade dummies can only provide a rough
characterization of a country’s outward orientation, especially in a decade where many countries
were actively engaged in liberalization. A preferable approach is to rely on liberalization dates, as
we also do in our cross-sectional empirical work to address this drawback of the SW indicator.
2.3 Trade Liberalization Dates Since 1994
2.3.1 Methodology and Data
In addition to creating the OPEN90-99 dummy and classifying countries based on liberalization
criteria for the entire decade, we also identiﬁed the year in which countries opened up. The
liberalization date is intended to be the date after which all of the SW openness criteria are
continuously met, although, as described above, data limitations often imposed reliance on country
case studies of trade policy. Our choice of liberalization dates was based on annual tariﬀ,n o n t a r i ﬀ,
data to characterize the openness status of these 4 countries during the 1990-1999 period.
9SW’s XMB and SOC indicators were based on 1991 and 1987 data, respectively, so that employing 1999 data
was consistent with their approach, however questionable the latter may be. The majority of countries that abolished
export marketing boards throughout the 1990s did so during the ﬁrst half of the decade, as shown in Appendix
2. However, relying on end-of-period SOC data means that some of the Eastern European countries and New
Independent States of the former USSR are classiﬁed as open.
7and black market premium primary data. In addition, a variety of secondary sources were utilized,
particularly to identify the dates when export marketing boards were abolished and multiparty
governance systems replaced the Communist Party’s undivided rule. For several post-Communist
economies, due to data limitations we relied, like SW, on the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (1994) classiﬁcation and their standards of openness.10 Appendix 2-B presents the
dates of trade liberalization, and Appendix 3 contains detailed country summaries of liberalization
episodes, along with an explanation of the chosen dates.
Despite the clear criteria stated above, SW’s dates of liberalization could not conform to their
ﬁve formal criteria for openness, because comparable data was lacking for many time periods.
Hence, there is much scope for disagreement with SW’s classiﬁcation, especially in light of new
data published since their study. In our systematic review of the SW dates since 1990, we came
to disagree with SW on the liberalization status or dates in the case of several countries.11 Table
3 presents the dates of liberalization for 16 countries that were labeled as closed at the end of
the SW sample period (1994), but liberalized between 1995 and 2001. In addition to these, the
table displays data for Cape Verde and Panama, which were not classiﬁed in the SW study. Finally,
there are ﬁve cases where we disagreed with the SW assignment of liberalization dates, as explained
in Appendix 3.12 Table 4 displays the 35 countries that remained closed as of 2001, including 5
countries that were not classiﬁed in the SW study and 4 countries for which we disagree with them,
as explained in Appendix 3.13 To summarize, out of 141 countries in our sample, 18 liberalized
between 1995 and 2001 and 35 remained closed as of 2001.
2.4 The RR critique
RR found that the BMP and XMB variables played a major role in the classiﬁcation of countries
as open or closed. They state that a dummy variable for openness based on the BMP and XMB
criteria alone leads to “a partition between closed and open economies that is much closer to that
generated by OPEN [the SW dummy] than the partition generated by (the socialist country dummy,
and the tariﬀs and nontariﬀ barriers criteria alone)”. Speciﬁcally, they showed that the BMP and
10See Appendix 3 for speciﬁc cases in which the EBRD (1994) opening dates were utilized.
11Previously, Wacziarg and Wallack (2003) had systematically checked the SW liberalization dates prior to 1990
in a subset of the SW sample, uncovering little disagreement.
12These 5 countries were Côte d’Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Mauritania, Niger and Trinidad and Tobago.
13These 4 countries were Belarus, Croatia, Estonia and India.
8XMB criteria generated a dummy variable that diﬀered from the SW dummy in only 6 cases, while
the TAR, NTB and SOC criteria used jointly generated a dummy variable that diﬀered from the
SW dummy in 31 cases. Hence, they argued that the SW dummy for the 1970-89 period reﬂected
mostly the black market premium and the export marketing board criteria. Moreover, they argued
that the latter reﬂected only African countries (many of which were classiﬁed as closed based on
this criterion alone), and therefore amounted to an “Africa dummy”.14
To what extent are our updated SW data subject to the RR critique? We found that BMP
was the sole criterion on the basis of which 26 of our 42 countries were classiﬁed as closed in the
1990-1999 decade, while XMB was the sole criterion on which 9 countries were classiﬁed as closed.
Moreover, 3 countries were classiﬁed as closed based on both the BMP and XMB criteria. Hence,
only 4 countries were classiﬁed as closed based on the other three criteria. These were India, due
its the level of tariﬀ and nontariﬀ barriers, and Pakistan, due to tariﬀs. Bangladesh was closed
based on both the TAR and BMP criteria. China was classiﬁed as closed based on the BMP and
SOC criteria. Based on the updated data, we found that the BMP and XMB criteria generated
a dummy variable that diﬀered from the 1990-1999 updated SW dummy in only 2 cases, while
the TAR, NTB, and SOC criteria used jointly generated a dummy variable that diﬀered from
the updated SW dummy in 38 cases.15 To summarize, our openness status dummy variable for
1990-1999 is subject to the same objections that RR placed against the SW classiﬁcation for the
1970-1989 openness dummy.
T h eR Rc r i t i q u ei sv a l i dn o to n l yi nt e r m so fcountries’ statuses based on the OPEN90-99
dummy, but also to some extent in terms of their liberalization dates. Since most countries were
classiﬁed as closed based on the XMB and BMP criteria, not surprisingly when they opened up
they did so when these variables changed. The BMP and XMB variables were the factors that
determined the year of liberalization in many of the countries that opened up during the 1990s.
The exceptions tend to be the Eastern European and New Independent States of the former USSR
14SW based the XMB criterion entirely on the World Bank (1994) study of African countries which had been
involved in a World Bank or IMF structural adjustment program between 1987 and 1991. RR noted that SW classify
all but one of the Sub-Saharan African countries as closed based on the XMB criterion, which is not applied to any
other region. In contrast, we gathered and used XMB data for countries other than African ones.
15Of the countries in which the TAR, NTB, and SOC dummy and the updated SW dummy disagree, 20 are African
and 10 are Eastern European or newly independent states of the former USSR. In other words, these were classiﬁed
as closed based on either the XMB or the BMP criterion or both.
9which opened based on the SOC criteria, i.e. general reforms related to the liberalization of their
centrally-planned economies. We found that the tariﬀ barriers criterion was not a decisive factor in
assigning a liberalization date for any country and nontariﬀ barriers were the determining factor only
in the case of Panama. However, as we describe in considerable detail in Appendix 3, policy changes
that reduced the BMP or removed XMBs were generally accompanied by changes in the levels of
other types of trade barriers, such as tariﬀ and nontariﬀ barriers, which had initial values below
the SW thresholds of 40%. Hence, liberalization dates do not simply capture changes in the BMP
and XMB variables, but also reﬂect broader liberalization. Given that our dates of liberalization
were cross-checked systematically against a case-study literature of reform in developing countries,
we are conﬁdent that they reﬂect important shifts in trade policy.16
3 Trade and Growth Revisited
3.1 Updating the SW results in the cross-section
The SW study attracted considerable attention in part because the estimated eﬀect of the cross-
sectional dummy variable for openness in regressions explaining 1970-1989 growth was on the order
of two percentage points of annual growth or more, a very large eﬀect in magnitude. The release
of updated PPP income data from the Penn World Tables version 6.0 (henceforth PWT6) and our
updated data on trade policy openness make it possible to replicate the SW regressions up to the
late 1990s.
For the sake of comparison with their paper, Table 5 replicates exactly the regressions in SW, for
the period 1970-1989. The only diﬀerence is that we use PWT6 data instead of the previous release.
As expected, the results are very much in accord with those in SW. The openness dummy for the
1970-1989 period enters highly signiﬁcantly and with a magnitude of as much as 2.2 percentage
points of annual growth, very much in line with the magnitude in SW.17 As in SW, simple regressions
16A similar point was made in Wacziarg and Wallack (2003), who argued that the SW liberalization dates were
good indicators of the timing of major trade policy changes, by thoroughly checking these dates against a case study
literature of trade liberalization in a set of 25 developing countries.
17We also replicated the SW regressions using the openness status that would be obtained without the ad hoc
reclassiﬁcations made by SW as described in Section 2.2.1, part 5 above and on p. 66-67 of the SW study. The
results, available upon request, involved a smaller eﬀect of this unadjusted SW dummy on growth - on the order of
1.8 points of annual growth at most.
10of growth on initial income for the sample of open versus the sample of closed economies (columns
2 and 3) suggest that open economies tend to converge unconditionally, while closed economies do
not.
Table 6 presents the results for the comparable regressions, for the 1990-1998 period, based on
our updated openness indicator. Aside from the use of updated data, the regressions involve some
minor diﬀerences in controls compared to the SW speciﬁcation due to data related considerations.
Speciﬁcally, we used the ratio of government consumption to GDP from PWT6 rather than the
ratio of government consumption to GDP net of spending on the military and education, because we
lack the latter data for the 1990s. Second, we used the number of revolutions per year rather than
the number of revolutions and coups.18 Finally, we used SW’s own indicator of extreme political
repression and unrest (POL), i.e. we did not update this variable for the 1990s (this variable is
only entered in 2 out of 4 of the SW growth speciﬁcations and the coeﬃcient on the liberalization
indicator is not sensitive to its inclusion).
The main lesson from Table 6 is that the SW results break down completely for the 1990s. The
openness dummy variable enters with a coeﬃcient that is statistically indistinguishable from zero in
regressions (4)-(7). Moreover, it is no longer true that the openness dummy can eﬀectively partition
countries among which absolute convergence is observed from those that diverge - in fact the signs
are reversed, with open economies displaying divergence while closed economies display convergence.
A noteworthy feature of these regressions is that the 1990s data features 78 open countries and
27 closed economies. This is in sharp contrast with the 1970-89 openness classiﬁcation, which
featured 31 open countries and 74 closed ones. Clearly, the updated openness indicator can no
longer eﬀectively partition fast growing from slow growing countries.
A potential argument is that what constitutes an open country diﬀers in the 1990s compared to
earlier periods. For example, in a context where most countries have already opened up to trade,
even moderate barriers can eﬀectively isolate a country from the world economy. In other words,
perhaps the SW criteria for openness are not stringent enough for the 1990s. However, if we make
it harder for countries to be classiﬁed as open by reducing the SW thresholds for the TAR and
18Using the number of revolutions and coups is actually a mistake, although a frequent one in the cross-country
literature on political instability. These data come from Arthur Banks’ cross national time series database. “Coups”
describe successful revolutions, while “revolutions” describe any attempt to overthrow the government, successful or
not. Summing the two amounts to double counting successful revolutions.
11NTB variables to 20%, and the BMP threshold to 10% (while keeping the XMB and SOC criteria
unchanged), we ﬁnd that the open countries actually grow slower than closed ones (the estimated
eﬀect being statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level). Hence, a partitioning of countries based on
more stringent criteria for openness in the 1990s does not restore the Sachs and Warner ﬁndings.19
A distinct possibility is that the classiﬁcation of countries as “open” or “closed” is too crude to
provide much explanatory information for growth in a simple cross-section.
3.2 Date-based openness indicators
An alternative and arguably better way to estimate the cross-sectional eﬀect of openness on growth
is to construct openness indicators based on the dates of liberalization. For example, the openness
status for 1980 takes on a value of 1 if a country has liberalized by 1980, and a value of 0 otherwise.
Subsequent growth (post 1980) can then be regressed on this variable and other controls. We con-
structed dummy variables for each decade in our sample in this fashion - one for 1970, one for 1980
and one for 1989. An advantage of this method over the period-speciﬁc dummy variables is that the
latter are based partly on information from the end of the period (the NTB, SOC, TAR and XMB
criteria), and partly on period averages (BMP). Hence, some countries might only have become
open late in the period, leading to a possible bias in the estimated eﬀect of openness. Constructing
openness indicators based on the dates of liberalization avoids these inherent problems of the SW
classiﬁcation methodology by isolating only those countries that were open at the beginning of a
period.
Tables 7 presents the results using our date-based indicators, for three separate decades. The
speciﬁcations are identical to those in SW, restricting the time span of each regression to a single
decade. The results are consistent with the observations made in the previous subsection. The
eﬀect of the liberalization status in the 1970s is weaker and smaller than in the 1980s, but positive
and signiﬁcant at the 90% level. Columns 3 and 4 show that the SW results were likely driven by the
19These results are available upon request. When we decrease the threshold criteria for TAR and NTB to 20%
and BMP to 10%, there were 25 more countries classiﬁed as closed. 13 of these were closed on the basis of TAR
(either solely or jointly), 6 based on NTB, and 11 based on BMP (several countries are classiﬁed as closed for multiple
reasons). There is much heterogeneity among the countries that are reclassiﬁed on the basis of these more stringent
crteria. For example, certain countries which experienced rapid growth during the period, or at least prior to 1997
(for example. Korea and Thailand) are considered closed based on the more stringent criteria. Other larger economies
(such as Brazil) are also classiﬁed as closed. The group of closed countries also includes a number of African countries.
12strong eﬀect of the liberalization status in 1980 on growth in the 1980s. Finally, the eﬀect is positive
but statistically indistinguishable from zero in the 1990s, when countries are partitioned according
to their liberalization status as of 1989. Hence, the results presented earlier were not driven by the
fact that the cross-sectional openness dummy relies on averaged or end-of-period data. Moreover,
they were not driven by possible misclassiﬁcations of countries due to minor diﬀerences in the way
we updated the SW dummy to the 1990s (as described above in subsection 2.2.2), since the 1989
openness status is based entirely on SW’s own data. We conclude that SW’s cross-sectional ﬁndings
are highly sensitive to the decade under consideration.
3.3 Random eﬀects results
Another advantage of the date-based indicators is that they allow us to treat our data as a panel,
and thereby to exploit potential eﬃciency gains resulting from panel data estimation methods. We
constructed a panel with three periods (1970-1979, 1980-1989 and 1990-1998) in order to estimate
the eﬀects of the openness indicator on growth over a longer span of time. We use a ﬂexible form
of the random eﬀects estimator which is often used in the cross-country literature (see Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 12). This allows eﬃciency gains through the estimation of cross-
period error covariances. Our estimator is based on the Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR)
framework: we ﬁrst formulated one equation per time period, constrained the coeﬃcients on each
regressor to equality across periods, and ran SUR on the resulting system of three equations.
The results are presented in Table 8. The estimated coeﬃcient on the liberalization status
dummy is statistically signiﬁcant and lies between 1.2 and 1.4 annual percentage points of growth,
depending on the speciﬁcation, for the period 1970-1998 overall. This estimate is smaller than
that obtained in a pure cross-section by SW for 1970-1989, but larger than that obtained above
for the 1990-1998 period. In fact, Table 9, which runs the speciﬁcation with the complete list of
control variables using SUR, but without constraining the coeﬃcients to equality across periods,
shows that the estimated eﬀect of the openness indicator is essentially zero for 1990-1998, and was
driving down the overall eﬀect in the constrained regressions of Table 8. Similarly, the eﬀect of
liberalization for the 1980s (and to a lesser extent for the 1970s) drove the overall positive eﬀect
in Table 8. These SUR results are therefore consistent with the ﬁndings obtained from period by
period regressions, as discussed in subsection 3.1.2.
To summarize, exploiting the panel dimension of the data does not change our basic result that
13the SW liberalization status is conditionally uncorrelated with growth for the 1990s.
4 Within-Country Liberalization Dynamics
As we argued above, a cross-sectional dummy variable based on the SW criteria is likely to be a
poor measure of trade policy orientation. We have outlined the data limitations associated with
this method, and conﬁrmed objections ﬁrst proposed by RR. We have also shown that an updated
dummy for the 1990s was conditionally uncorrelated to economic growth across countries, so that
the results in SW were speciﬁc to their chosen time period. In this section, we argue that better use
can be made of the data on dates of liberalization. With almost ﬁfty years of data on growth and
openness, it becomes possible to assess the within-country eﬀects of discrete changes in trade policy
openness.20 In what follows we will compare the means of economic growth and other variables of
interest such as physical capital investment rates and trade volumes under a liberalized versus a
non-liberalized regime.
4.1 Liberalization and Growth
To assess the within-country eﬀect of growth on liberalization, we ran ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions of
growth on a binary liberalization indicator, deﬁned by the dates of liberalization. The regressions
amount to diﬀerence regressions in growth, or diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence regressions in log income:
logyit − logyit−1 = αi + βLIBit + εit (1)
where yit is per capita income, LIBit =1if t is greater than the year of liberalization and no
reversal of the trade policy reforms have occurred, 0 otherwise. Table 10 shows that, in our sample,
31.7% of country-year observations occur in a liberalized regime (the sample period is 1950-1998).
20SW, p. 57-59, also presented some within country evidence on liberalization and growth for a restricted sample
of 37 reformers. They presented estimates for one ﬁxed-eﬀects regression of growth on dummy variables for three
time periods around liberalization episodes. They showed growth was depressed by 0.88 percentage points in the
three years prior to a liberalization, increased on average by 1.09 percentage points annually in the three years
following liberalization, and increased by 1.33 points thereafter (all relative to growth in years preceding 3 years
before liberalization). These limited results are of the same order of magnitude as our more detailed ﬁndings. We
thoroughly investigate the robustness of these estimates, extend them in time (our sample period spans 1950 to 1998
rather than 1966-1993) and space (our sample includes up to 133 countries rather than 37) and present new evidence
on investment and openness, none of which SW did.
14The conditional mean of annual growth of per capita GDP given that a country is liberalized is
2.71%, while the mean is 1.18% in a non-liberalized regime (a diﬀerence of 1.53 points of annual
growth). Note however that these simple conditional means are based on both cross-sectional
and within-country variation. To isolate the within-country variation, Table 11 displays ﬁxed-
eﬀects regressions of growth on the liberalization indicator. The univariate regression for 1950-1998
indicates that the within-country diﬀerence in growth between a liberalized and a non-liberalized
regime is 0.56 percentage points. While all time invariant country characteristics are held constant
in this regression, it may be the case that growth rates vary systematically through time. Similarly,
periods of openness tend to follow periods of isolation, rather than the reverse, so that the LIBit
indicator could also be correlated with time. To correct for the possible bias this would introduce,
we added a trend or year dummies to the regression (both are expected to generate similar results).
The eﬀect of LIBit on growth is now raised to magnitudes in line with the unconditional mean
diﬀerence of 1.53 points. These coeﬃcients are estimated with great statistical precision.
In all speciﬁcations the estimated within-country eﬀect actually rises through time, and is
maximized for the 1990s decade. This stands in sharp contrast with the cross-sectional results
presented above: countries that liberalized in the 1990s experienced a larger post-liberalization
increase in growth than countries that liberalized in any other decade. Indeed, the estimated
diﬀerence in growth for the 1990s is roughly 2.5 percentage points in the speciﬁcations that include
a time trend or year dummy variables, and is even larger when these controls are omitted.
4.2 Liberalization and Investment
The empirical literature on trade and growth suggests that the eﬀects of liberalization on economic
growth are mediated largely by the rate of physical capital investment. Several authors, for example
Levine and Renelt (1992), Baldwin and Seghezza (1996) and Wacziarg (2001) have suggested that
investment rates are the main channel linking trade and growth. This ﬁnding is based largely
on cross-country ﬁndings. To investigate this issue in our within-country context, we can run
ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions of investment rates on the liberalization indicator:
Iit
Yit
= ηi + φLIBit + vit (2)
where Iit is physical capital investment and Yit is GDP in country i at time t.
Table 12 reports the estimates of such regressions. Our new within-country evidence conﬁrms
past cross-country ﬁndings. On average, a country in a liberalized regime experiences a rate of
15physical capital investment that is between 1.2 and 1.9 percentage points higher than in a non-
liberalized regime, for the period 1950-1998. This represents between 13% and 20% of this variable’s
standard deviation in the pooled sample. The eﬀects seem largest in the initial period of the sample
(1950-1970), and declined in the 1980s and 1990s (although they remain positive and statistically
signiﬁcant when a trend or year eﬀects are included).
To get a rough notion of how much of the eﬀect of trade policy openness on growth can be
attributed to the investment channel, we ran ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions of growth on the investment
rate. Table 13 reports the results from these regressions. The coeﬃcient on investment in the
baseline 1950-1998 regression (column 3) is 0.151%. In turn, the eﬀect of liberalization on invest-
ment in the corresponding regression of Table 13 is 1.937 points. Multiplying the two together, the
eﬀect of liberalization on growth via investment is estimated to be roughly 0.292. This compares
to a total eﬀect of liberalization on growth of 1.417 percentage points (Table 11). Hence, by this
rough calculation the investment channel accounts for 21% of the eﬀect of liberalization on growth.
This is less than the channel eﬀect uncovered in some cross-sectional studies. Wacziarg (2001),
for instance, attributed 50% of the eﬀect of trade policy openness on growth between 1970 and
1989 to the investment channel. This may be because the eﬀect of liberalization on investment has
fallen through time, so that incorporating the 1990s into the analysis reduced the average eﬀect
of liberalization through this channel. It may also be due to the estimation of the eﬀect using
within-country variation exclusively, rather than cross-sectional variation. Whatever the reason for
the smaller channel eﬀect, our analysis does provide suggestive evidence that investment constitutes
an important channel whereby trade-centered liberalization aﬀects growth within countries.
4.3 Liberalization and Openness
N e x t ,w ee x a m i n ew h e t h e rt r a d ep o l i c yl i b e r a l i z a t i o ni sf o l l o w e db yab r e a ki nt h ev o l u m eo f
trade, measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. If this is the case, it provides an
indication that the policy we label “liberalization” raised actual the level of openness of the economy.
This is important because announced reforms may be poorly implemented or counteracted by the
enactment of alternative trade barriers. For example, the removal of non-tariﬀ barriers in India
over 2000-2001 was accompanied by a ﬂurry of phytosanitary measures and antidumping ﬁlings
which eﬀectively kept imports of “sensitive” items out. If trade liberalization were associated with
increases in trade volumes, we could be more conﬁdent that it actually raised the level of exposure of
16the reforming country to the world economy. To examine this issue, we ran the following regression:
Xit + Mit
Yit
= νi + δLIBit + wit (3)
where Xit denotes exports and Mit denotes imports. Table 14 presents the results. Clearly, since
the level of openness rises through time in almost all countries irrespective of liberalization, the ap-
propriate econometric speciﬁcation involves the inclusion of either a time trend or of period-speciﬁc
dummy variables (second and third panels of Table 14). Our evidence suggests that liberalization
raises openness by roughly 5 percentage points of GDP when considering the full sample period
1950-1998. However, this eﬀect is indistinguishable from zero in the 1990-1998 time period. This
may be due to the fact that, for countries that liberalized in the 1990s, there are too few years of
data since liberalization to observe a break in the growth of trade volumes. Still, we do observe
growth eﬀects of liberalization in this decade. For most periods, however, trade liberalization as
we deﬁne was associated with sustained and large increases in the eﬀective level of exposure of the
reforming country to the world economy.
4.4 Timing of the Eﬀects
The simple average diﬀerence between growth in a non-liberalized regime and growth in a liberalized
regime may mask interesting timing issues. For example, it provides no information on how soon
the eﬀects occur, or on whether they may cease to be felt after a few years following reforms. In this
subsection, we examine the time path of growth, investment and openness for an average country
before and after liberalization.
Figures 2 through 4 present the sample average growth rate, investment rate and openness ratio,
respectively, for twenty years before and twenty years after a liberalization. Since several countries
had varying numbers of years of data before and after their speciﬁc liberalization, these averages
at each point in time are based on diﬀerent samples of countries (a problem we address below).21
However, they are quite informative. First, despite the fact that we are controlling for neither a
time trend nor for year eﬀects, the increase in growth post-liberalization is remarkably similar to
that obtained in Table 11 - growth before trade-centered reforms averages 1.5% and rises to roughly
3% post-reforms. Second, there does not seem to be a strong time pattern - the eﬀects seem quite
immediate and do not die out after a few years. It does seem that the few years immediately
21We removed from the sample countries that never experienced liberalizations, as well as those that experienced
policy reversals and/or multiple liberalizations.
17preceding a liberalization are low-growth years, but as discussed above this fact does not bias the
coeﬃcients estimated in Table 13.
Figures 3 and 4 conﬁrm our previous observations. The investment rate seems to “take-oﬀ”
during the 10 years that follow a liberalization, and thereafter remains high. The plotted eﬀect
seems larger than that uncovered in the regressions, perhaps because of the somewhat diﬀerent
sample. Openness (Figure 4) follows a more or less linear trend upward, without an apparent break
at the date of liberalization. However, our more formal tests based on ﬁxed-eﬀects did reveal an
eﬀect attributable to liberalization, even after controlling for a trend or for time dummies.
The fact that the sample of countries used to compute each year’s average values of these vari-
ables varies across years may introduce some bias in these pictures. To account for this, we isolated
39 countries for which we have growth, investment and openness data for 8 years before and after
liberalization.22 One drawback is that we now have only 8 rather than 20 years around liberaliza-
tion, and that the sample may include many early liberalizers and therefore be less representative.
Nonetheless, the plots displayed in Figures 5, 6 and 7 are remarkably similar to those in Figures 2,
3 and 4, reinforcing our conﬁdence in our results.
To further examine the timing of the growth, investment and openness responses to liberal-
ization, we deﬁned dummy variables for four (non-overlapping) periods surrounding the reforms.
We then ran-ﬁxed eﬀects regressions of growth, investment and openness on these four dummy
variables. The speciﬁcation was as follows:
logyit − logyit−1 = αi + β1D1it + β2D2it + β3D3it + β4D4it + εit (4)
where D1it =1if T − 3 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 and zero otherwise, D2it =1if T ≤ t ≤ T +2 , D3 =1
if T +3≤ t ≤ T +6 ,a n dD4 =1if t>T+6 .T h e c o e ﬃcients on these dummy variables
capture the average diﬀerence in growth between these years and the period preceding 3 years
before liberalization (which is the baseline period). We ran the corresponding speciﬁcations for the
investment rate and openness ratio, and the results are presented in Table 15.23
22These 39 countries were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark,
Finland, France, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philip-
pines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Tunisia, Uganda and Uruguay.
23We had to drop countries which experienced policy reversals or multiple liberalizations, for which the deﬁnitions
of the dummy variables are not straightforward. This reduced our sample from 133 to 118 countries.
18The results are consistent with the observations made from Figures 2-4. In the baseline spec-
iﬁcation of column (3), growth is depressed by 0.55 percentage points in the three years before
liberalization, compared to preceding years. In the three years following liberalization, growth rises
slightly (by 0.30 percentage points), but this eﬀect is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In
T +3 , sustained growth diﬀerences become noticeable - with increases in growth of 1.44 points in
period T +3to T +6 ,a n do f1 percentage point after that, relative to the baseline period. To
summarize, the typical timing pattern revealed by these regressions is one where pre-liberalization
growth is slightly depressed, and growth is raised in the years that follow two years after the re-
forms by anywhere between 1 and 1.5 percentage points. A similar pattern applies to investment
and openness. Of course, these estimates reﬂect the sample average, and may mask interesting
country-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences, which we discuss in Section 5.
4.5 Concurrent Events and Policies
Our analysis above is subject to two important caveats, which we now address. First, economic
or political crises may be precursors of policy reform, which could depress growth and investment
rates in the period immediately preceding reforms, biasing our estimates upwards. Second, trade
reform is often associated with other types of external and domestic reforms, such as capital market
liberalization, domestic deregulation, etc., in which case we might wrongly attribute to trade reforms
the eﬀect of these other policy changes. In what follows we address these two potential limitations
of our analysis.
4.5.1 Concurrent Events
Countries that liberalize often do so following periods of economic turmoil. Tornell (1998) showed
that most (60%) episodes of economic reform, including trade reform, occur in the aftermath of
a domestic political or economic crisis. In this case, pre-reform growth could be depressed due to
other factors and we could wrongly associate post-reform changes in growth rates to the reforms
per se. To account for this possibility, Table 16 presents ﬁxed-eﬀects results that exclude the year of
liberalization (columns 1-3) as well as the three years surrounding the year of liberalization (column
4-6). These results are not sensitive to the number of years excluded - they were little changed
when we excluded 5 years around the liberalization date, for instance.24
24T h e s er e s u l t sa r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .
19Surprisingly, the estimated diﬀerence in growth between the liberalized and now-liberalized
regimes is raised slightly when we exclude the year of reform or the three years around it. The
orders of magnitude remain in line with the estimates discussed earlier - anywhere between 0.6
and 1.5 percentage points of annual growth, depending on the speciﬁcation. This robustness check
increases our conﬁdence that our estimates are not driven by the economic and political turmoil
that often immediately precedes liberalizations.
4.5.2 Concurrent Policies: The Scope of Reforms
Another important caveat is that trade liberalization may go hand in hand with other types of
domestic reforms. For instance, countries carrying out programs of trade reform often enact at the
same time policies of domestic deregulation and privatization, other microeconomic reforms and
macroeconomic adjustment. In such a context, it is simply wrong to interpret the coeﬃcient on
liberalization in a within-country growth regression as the total eﬀect of trade liberalization per se.25
A more realistic interpretation of our estimates is that they capture the impact of trade-centered
reforms more broadly. It is diﬃcult to directly address this point unless a signiﬁcant fraction of
our sample carried out trade reforms in isolation from other reforms.
Fortunately, we can distinguish countries that carried out overall reforms from those that carried
out external sector reforms in relative isolation from other domestic reforms. Wacziarg and Wallack
(2003) discussed 25 episodes of trade liberalization occurring mostly in developing countries and
predominantly in the 1980s. 14 of these were accompanied by market-oriented domestic reforms,
while 8 episodes were characterized as “pure” trade reforms (which occurred in isolation from major
shifts in domestic policy) and 3 involved active counteraction of external sector reforms through
programs of domestic subsidization to import competing industries. The distinction between pure
trade reforms and overall reforms was based mostly on whether the countries implemented a sub-
stantial program of privatizations at the same time as trade reforms. We isolated a sample of 21
countries that were part of the Wacziarg and Wallack (2003) study, and that were classiﬁed either
as “trade reformers”, or as “overall reformers”.26 We then examined whether the within-country
25This is related to an analogous point often made in a cross-country context. Some observers, for instance RR,
have suggested that "bad" government policies tend to go together, so that it is hard to disentangle the eﬀects of
trade policy from those of poor macroeconomic management, poor governance or poor institutions in general.
26We excluded India from this list as India had not liberalized in the sample period according to the criteria of
the current paper (in Wacziarg and Wallack (2001) India was classiﬁed as having opened in 1994, based on diﬀerent
20eﬀects of liberalization on growth diﬀered between trade reformers and overall reformers.
Our results are presented in Table 17. There are several noteworthy features of these results.
First, despite the fact that we are restricting our attention to 21 of our 133 countries, the estimates
for the pooled sample of 21 countries are remarkably similar to those obtained with the full sample.
For instance, the eﬀe c to fl i b e r a l i z a t i o no ng r o w t hi nt h er e d u c e ds a m p l ei s1.585 in our baseline
speciﬁcation (that which includes both country and year eﬀects, column 3), compared to a corre-
sponding ﬁgure of 1.417 in the full sample (Table 11, column 1, bottom panel). This reinforces our
conﬁdence in the robustness of our ﬁndings and also suggests that our sample of 21 is representative
of the broader sample.
Second, the estimate of the impact of trade liberalization for those countries that carried out
trade reforms in isolation are commensurate with the corresponding estimates for those countries
that also reformed their domestic sectors, despite the crude nature of the distinction between overall
reformers and pure trade reformers. Admittedly, the coeﬃcients are estimated with less precision
(although the coeﬃcient on the liberalization dummy is signiﬁcant at the 90% level), but this is
likely due to the small sample of “pure trade” reformers (7 countries, or 331 observations). A
plausible conclusion based on these suggestive results is that the eﬀect of trade centered reforms is
in large part attributable to its external reform component. We further discuss this issue in Section
5, in the context of individual country experiences.
4.5.3 Concurrent Policies: Other External Reforms
Trade reforms are sometimes associated with other types of external reforms, such as capital market
liberalization. To the extent this is the case, our estimates may capture the impact of these ﬁnancial
reforms rather than trade reforms. This argument is frequently invoked to criticize the diﬀerence
estimates presented above. We can directly assess the merits of the claim that external ﬁnancial
liberalization is concurrent with trade liberalization by looking at data on the timing of ﬁnancial
reforms.
criteria). Our results were not aﬀected by the inclusion or exclusion of India. Additionally, we excluded the three
countries classiﬁed as “counteractors”, since results based on only 3 countries are not likely to be very meaningful.
Separate results for counteractors are however available upon request. Our sample consisted of Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco,
New Zealand, Paraguay, Poland, Spain, Sri Lanka, Trinidad & Tobago and Uruguay.
21Bekaert, Harvey and Lunblad (2001) examine the impact of capital market liberalization on
economic growth in a panel context, using both cross-sectional and within-country time varia-
tion, ﬁnding robust positive eﬀects of ﬁnancial liberalization. To obtain this result, they use data
from Bekaert and Harvey (2000) on the dates of oﬃcial regulatory reforms pertaining to ﬁnancial
markets.27 We use their dates and compare them to our own dates of trade liberalization.
Out of the 106 countries that had liberalized by 2001 in our sample of 141, Bekaert and Harvey
(2000) characterize the date of oﬃcial ﬁnancial liberalization for 40 countries.28 Of these, only
2 countries (Brazil and Turkey) have exactly the same year of oﬃcial ﬁnancial regulatory reform
and trade liberalization. Moreover, only 9 countries implemented ﬁnancial sector reforms within
3 years before and after the date of trade liberalization, and 17 did so within 5 years before and
after. Many countries never enacted ﬁnancial liberalizations, but did enact trade reforms, so the
numbers cited above overstate the extent of coincidence between ﬁnancial and trade liberalization
dates. In summary, there is little reason to believe, contrary to common claims, that trade reform
and ﬁnancial market liberalization are concurrent, and therefore that our estimates might confound
the eﬀects of both types of reform.
5 Individual Country Cases
The results presented above summarize the eﬀect of trade liberalization on growth and other vari-
ables for a sample of very diverse countries. Fixed-eﬀects allow us to control for all time-invariant
country characteristics, but on the other hand our estimated coeﬃcients on liberalization are not
country-speciﬁc, and merely represent the average response. The reaction of diﬀerent countries
to reforms is likely to be diﬀerent, especially since the depth and scope of reforms diﬀered across
countries. In fact, we show in what follows that there is considerable heterogeneity in the response
of growth to trade reform. Much can be learned from this variation. In this section, we examine
speciﬁc cases of reforms in countries that are representative of our broader sample, and for which we
observe enough data on growth, investment and openness before and after reforms. The goal is to
get a sense of the intricacies of reform in speciﬁc cases, and to illustrate the economic mechanisms
that give rise to the average eﬀects described above. We ﬁrst examine the time paths of growth,
27Henry (2003) also presents data on economic and political reforms for a smaller set of 18 developing countries.
We use some of his data in discussing speciﬁc country cases in Section 5 below.
28This comparison between the Bekaert and Harvey (2000) dates and our own is available upon request.
22investment and openness for a subsample of 24 developing countries for which we have at least 8
years of data on either side of the liberalization date, and then turn to a more detailed discussion
of reforms in 13 of those countries.
5.1 Country-SpeciﬁcE ﬀects
Figures 8 and 9 present 24 individual country plots of the 3-year moving average of per capita
income growth against time. We started from the sample used to create ﬁgures 5, 6 and 7, i.e. the
39 countries for which we have at least 8 years of data on either side of the date of liberalization.
Among those, we further restricted attention to emerging markets, the main focus of this study.29
There is tremendous variation in growth rates in these countries, and the 3-year moving average
does not dampen these ﬂuctuations suﬃciently for a very clear picture to emerge.30 However,
horizontal lines representing average growth before and after liberalization reveal positive growth
eﬀects in 13 of 24 countries, and negative eﬀects in 6 countries. The remaining 5 countries exhibited
an eﬀect close to zero, as further illustrated in Table 18. A few noteworthy cases where large post-
liberalization growth eﬀects appear quite clearly are Ghana, Guinea, Mauritius, Poland and Taiwan.
In most other cases the variation in growth precludes a clear visual analysis of country-speciﬁcc a s e s .
Table 18 presents the mean change in growth, openness and investment rates for this sample of
24 countries, providing a perhaps clearer picture of those that experienced signiﬁcant increases in
growth. Within those that experienced positive eﬀects, the magnitude of the growth increase ranged
from 0.86 percentage points of per capita income growth in Poland to 3.62 points in Mauritius.
The range of growth declines, among the 6 aﬀected countries, was of a similar amplitude. Below,
we discuss some possible reasons for this cross-sectional variation in growth eﬀects.
Figures 10 and 11 present the time path of the investment rate around liberalization and Figures
12 and 13 do the same for openness, for the same set of 24 countries. Table 18 summarizes the
29These 24 countries are Benin, Botswana, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, South Korea, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Paraguay, the Philippines, Poland, Taiwan,
Tunisia, Uganda and Uruguay.
30Increasing the number of years over which the moving average is calculated would dampen the distinction between
growth under a liberalized regime liberalization and growth under a non-liberalized regime for the years around
liberalization. We have replicated these pictures with a 5-year moving average and they looked quite similar. Figures
2a n d5o rt h eﬁxed-eﬀects results presented above are of course a much better way to summarize the average
relationship linking liberalization to growth than country speciﬁcg r a p h s .
23before and after comparison for these variables. Investment rates and openness exhibit considerably
more time persistence than per capita income growth and it is therefore easier to get a clear visual
picture of country experiences. There are again large variations across individual countries. The
post-liberalization surge in investment rates is particularly clear for Chile, Colombia, Hungary,
Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Poland and Taiwan. The break in the openness series is particularly
apparent for Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ghana, Hungary, Jordan, Korea, Mauritius, Poland and
Taiwan.
To summarize, a closer examination of post-liberalization changes in growth, investment and
openness for a restricted sample of developing countries reveals a considerable amount of hetero-
geneity in these countries’ experiences with reform. In what follows, we turn to a series of case
studies to try to develop hypotheses that could account for these diﬀerences.
5.2 Discussion of SpeciﬁcC o u n t r yC a s e s
From the sample of 24 developing countries for which we have at least 8 years of data on either
side of liberalization, illustrated in Figures 8 to 13, we have selected a smaller sub-sample of 13
countries in order to carry our more detailed case studies. Our goal here is to choose a suﬃciently
small set of countries so that we can describe in some detail their preexisting conditions, overall
policy environment and macroeconomic circumstances, while maintaining a geographically diverse
sample reﬂecting the range of country speciﬁcg r o w t he ﬀects identiﬁed above. Ultimately, we seek
to uncover patterns that could explain cross-country diﬀerences in individual countries’ responses
to liberalization.
The subsample was selected in order to represent a geographically diverse set of countries
having experienced diﬀerent growth eﬀects of liberalization, in roughly the same proportions as
the 24 countries discussed in Section 5.1. It includes 13 countries, 7 of which experienced higher
post-liberalization mean growth rates. These are Poland, Ghana, Uganda, Taiwan, Chile, Korea,
and Indonesia. In the case of two countries, Colombia and the Philippines, liberalization had
roughly zero eﬀect on their mean growth rates. The growth eﬀect of liberalization was negative in
4 countries included in the sub-sample: Hungary, Mexico, Botswana, and Israel. To highlight the
overall policy context existing in these countries around the time of reforms, Appendix 4 describes
in detail their concurrent reforms, macroeconomic environment and political context, and this
description serves as the basis for the generalizations we now seek to draw. Based on our case
24analysis of this sub-sample of countries, several observations can be drawn.
Sustained Reforms. In the case of the majority of countries having experienced higher growth
post liberalization, trade reforms were not strictly limited to the period of liberalization. Rather,
these countries continued to deepen trade reform after the time of liberalization. For example, after
liberalizing in 1963 and 1968, respectively, Taiwan and Korea continued to lower tariﬀsa n dr e m o v e
NTBs, particularly during the mid-1980s and 1990s. In the case of Chile, which liberalized in 1976,
it recovered from the Latin American debt crisis and continued to grow during the late 1980s.
During this period, it furthered trade liberalization through decreasing tariﬀs and implementing
several bilateral free trade agreements. In Uganda, the 1988 liberalization was followed by a second
wave of external reforms in 1993-1994. Finally, Indonesia also sustained the initial reforms of 1970
with a reductions in export duties in 1976 and further trade-centered liberalization throughout the
1980s.
Th e S cop e of Re f o rms. As detailed in Section 4. 5.2, whether trade reforms we re part of a
package of other domestic reforms or occurred in relative isolation does not seem to help predict
their eﬀect on growth. Our case study analysis may reveal clues as to why this is the case. With
respect to the scope of reforms, these cases reveal the considerable complexity of this issue.
Among countries that implemented broad-based reforms, and where post-liberalization growth
increased, Chile and Poland stand out as prototypical success stories of reform. Both imple-
mented broad-based domestic reforms of which trade liberalization was only a part. On the other
hand, countries such as Hungary, Mexico and Colombia were classiﬁed as broad-based reformers
by Wacziarg and Wallack (2003), but average growth post-liberalization was actually lower. In the
case of Hungary, this may be because the domestic portion of the reform program (banking sector
reforms, privatizations) was in large measure delayed until 1995. Hence, to the extent that external
and domestic reforms are complementary, we may not observe the full eﬀects in our growth data
for Hungary, which extends only to 1998. The case of Mexico is more complex. In Mexico, the
privatization program began before trade liberalization, in 1984, with the sale of medium and small
businesses, and continued after 1986 with the sale of larger enterprises such as the national tele-
phone company, elements of the banking industry and national airline. While Mexico maintained
large government oligopolies that prevented broad industrial restructuring and resource realloca-
tion, one can hardly argue that its entry into GATT in 1986, and the concurrent reduction in
25external barriers, occurred in isolation from other domestic reforms. Finally, we suggest below
that political instability is probably at the heart of Colombia’s lack of a post-liberalization growth
increase.
The ﬂip-side of this coin is a country like Ghana, which according to Wacziarg and Wallack
(2003) implemented trade reforms in relative isolation (privatization for instance did not begin
until the early to mid 1990s), and did experience a 2 percentage point increase in mean growth
after the 1985 liberalization. Other interesting cases are the success stories of Southeast Asia.
There, many countries implemented policies aimed at increasing foreign direct investment around
the time of liberalization (as in Taiwan and Korea) at the same time or after external liberaliza-
tion. However, our three Southeast Asian examples (Indonesia, Taiwan and Korea) pursued growth
strategies involving widespread government involvement in the economy. In Indonesia, government
involvement increased during the 1970s, after external liberalization was begun. As is well-known,
South Korea and Taiwan both adopted activist industrial policies where the government was in-
volved in “picking winners”. Until the Asian crisis of 1998, the growth performance of these South
East Asian countries was historically unprecedented. Their experience shows that governmental
disengagement from the economy is not a necessary condition for successful trade reforms. What
all these countries shared was an outward-oriented development model where increasing exports
was a central pillar of the growth strategy.
Hence, as we suggested earlier in the paper, one cannot point to the breadth of reform as an
unambiguous criterion explaining diﬀerences in the growth response to liberalization. The picture
that emerges from our analysis of the scope of reforms is far from simple. In particular, broader
reforms should not be confused with government disengagement from the economic sphere. The set
of countries having experienced higher post-liberalization growth includes such diverse countries
as Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia on the one hand - countries that maintained heavy government
involvement in the economy - and Poland and Chile on the other hand - countries that actively
reduced the role of government in the economy. Similarly, the set of countries that experienced
negative or zero growth diﬀerentials after liberalization includes Mexico, Hungary and Colombia -
countries that actively disengaged the government from domestic economic activity at the time of
trade reforms.
26Counteractive Policies. Some of our 13 countries implemented policies that actively counter-
acted the eﬀects of trade reform, and as a result did note x p e r i e n c ei n c r e a s e si ng r o w t hr a t e s . 31
For instance, in Israel social pacts based on broad coalitions of labor, government, and industry
set the patterns for prices, wages, and the exchange rate in ways that mitigated the eﬀects of
trade openness on domestic producers. In the Philippines, trade liberalization was accompanied
by a large increase in the share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the economy, including a
doubling of the share of ﬁnancial ﬂows from the government to SOEs in GDP between 1987 and
1989. Such interventions, in part designed to protect domestic producers in the face of increased
import competition, precluded the realization of the gains from trade.
Macroeconomic Factors. Countries that did not experience growth increases after liberaliza-
tion often suﬀered from various mitigating circumstances, associated in particular with restrictive
macroeconomic policies. In Hungary and Mexico, two countries with lower post-liberalization
growth, trade reform was followed by tight monetary policies involving high interest rates, with a
depressing eﬀect on growth. Currency overvaluation also often acts to undo the eﬀects of trade
liberalization, as was the case in Mexico in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
The case of Botswana is also interesting. While generally considered an African success story,
Botswana did not experience a surge in growth post-liberalization. In fact, Botswana’s growth rate
prior to liberalization was, according to Table 18, roughly 2 percentage points higher than after
liberalization. The start of diamond mining in 1971 is often given credit for Botswana’s high level
of subsequent economic performance. Volatility on world diamond markets increased shortly after
Botswana implemented trade reforms, in 1979. In particular, the country experienced a recession
in 1981-1982, as a result of the weak world diamond market. Thus, terms of trade considerations
are essential in accounting for the absence of a post-liberalization growth surge in Botswana.
Political Instability. Several countries suﬀered from severe forms of political instability which
prevented the realization of the gains from trade liberalization. A prime example in our sample
of 13 is Colombia, where instability persisted throughout the 1990s. Other examples include the
Philippines and Israel. In contrast, countries which seem to have experienced higher growth post
reforms have also witnessed periods of relative political stability. Taiwan is a case in point, and
so are Korea, Indonesia and Chile, where liberalization coincided roughly with the rise to power
31Some of these cases are discussed in greater detail in Wacziarg and Wallack (2003).
27of authoritarian regimes, resulting in a degree of lasting political stability after periods of political
unrest.
To summarize, the packaging and timing of reforms is important to explain diﬀerences in post-
liberalization growth patterns. Countries that followed through by deepening trade reforms over
time, did better. Active governmental disengagement from industrial policy, and broad based re-
forms were not necessary conditions for success. Countries that counteracted a short-lived program
of external liberalization with domestic interventions did worse, as did countries that experienced
tight macroeconomic policies, unfavorable terms of trade shocks and political instability.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper introduced an updated dataset of trade policy indicators and liberalization dates. We
revisited the evidence on the cross-country eﬀects of SW’s simple dichotomous indicator of out-
ward orientation on economic growth, conﬁrming the pitfalls of this indicator ﬁrst underlined by
RR. Additionally, we showed that the partitioning of countries according to the SW dichotomous
indicator, while it eﬀectively separates fast growing countries from slow growing ones in the 1980s
and to a lesser extent in the 1970s, fails to do so in the 1990s. Simple dichotomous indicators of
outward orientation are too crude to capture the complexities of trade policy.
However, this paper suggests that liberalization dates, capturing episodes of discrete shifts in
trade policy, can be useful to estimate the within-country response of growth. We have painstakingly
checked and updated the SW dates of liberalization, relying both on quantitative data and on a
thorough review of country-speciﬁc case studies of reform. We presented new and robust evidence
that these dates of liberalization characterize breaks in growth, investment and openness series
within countries. Over the period 1950-1998, countries that have liberalized their trade regimes
have experienced, on average, increases in their annual rates of growth on the order of 1.5 percentage
points compared to pre-liberalization times. The post-liberalization increase in investment rates
was between 1.5 and 2 percentage points, conﬁrming past ﬁndings that liberalization works to foster
growth in part through its eﬀect on physical capital accumulation. Finally, liberalization raised the
trade to GDP ratio on average by roughly 5 percentage points after controlling for a time trend,
suggesting that episodes of trade policy liberalization did indeed raise the actual level of openness
of liberalizers. In a within-country sense, then, trade-centered reforms do have signiﬁcant eﬀects
on economic growth.
28While these within-country estimates based on a wide sample represent the average eﬀect of lib-
eralization on growth, investment and openness, they mask interesting diﬀerences in the individual
response of countries to trade liberalization. We have examined these individual responses country
by country. Restricting ourselves to a sample of 13 developing countries, we have compiled case
study data that might shed light on the sources of these diﬀerences. On the one hand, countries that
experienced positive eﬀects tended to deepen trade reforms. Yet active industrial policies such as
those implemented in South East Asia did not preclude growth gains from trade liberalization, and
broad-based reforms appear to be neither a necessary nor a suﬃcient condition for reaping these
gains. On the other hand, countries that experienced negative or no eﬀects on growth tended to
experience political instability, contractionary macroeconomic policies in the aftermath of reforms
or to actively counteract trade reform by shielding domestic sectors from necessary adjustments.
Future research should seek to further identify factors accounting for heterogeneity in the growth
eﬀects of trade reform.
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A.  Source and description of the Trade Openness Data 
 
Variable Description  Dates  Sources  Comments 
Wacziarg-Welch Variables 
Tariffs (TAR)  Average of unweighted 
average tariffs 
 
Dummy = 1 if  TAR > 40% 
1990-
1999 
UNCTAD 
(2001) 
World Bank 
(2000)  
WTO (various 
trade policy 
reviews) 
•  MFN ad-valorem rates based on the harmonized system of trade codes (HS) 
at the 6-digit industry level. 
•  Both the UNCTAD and World Bank data are compilations of data from 
various sources. 
•  All tariff data are unweighted except Croatia and Moldova in which the TAR 
data represent average weighted as opposed to unweighted tariffs due to lack 
of unweighted data. 
•  Countries that exceed the TAR threshold in our dataset based on unweighted 
data could conceivably not exceed the threshold based on weighted average 
data. Some indication of how frequently this occurs can be gleaned from 
World Bank data on weighted and unweighted tariffs available for two years 
since 1990 for 71 developing countries. The years for which this World 
Bank data are available vary from country to country, but one of the dates 
was typically in the first half of the 1990s and the other in the second half. 
The correlation between the weighted and unweighted series was greater 
than 97%. Furthermore, there were no cases where the unweighted tariff was 
smaller than 40% and the weighted tariff was greater than 40%. There were 
three cases (China in 1992, Brazil in 1989 and Zimbabwe in 1996) where the 
weighted tariff was smaller than 40% while the unweighted tariff was greater 
than 40%. Of these, China and Zimbabwe are classified as closed by us 
based on the black market premium criterion. Brazil is classified as open 
because the post-1990 unweighted tariff data averages 17.32%, but data on 
weighted tariffs for 1999 shows a value of 12.6%, making it highly unlikely 
that the average weighted tariff rate over the 1990s exceeded 40%. To 
summarize, the use of unweighted tariffs as opposed to weighted tariffs 
likely does not result in any country being classified differently. 
Non-Tariff 
Barriers (NTB) 
Average of core non-tariff 
barrier frequency on capital 
goods and intermediates.  Core 
non-tariff barriers include 
quotas, licensing, prohibitions, 
and administered pricing 
 
Dummy = 1 if  NTB > 40% 
 
1995-
1998 
Michalopoulos 
(1999) 
•  The NTB frequency reflects the % of products subject to NTBs, but not their 
degree of restrictiveness 
•  Core NTBs exclude technical measures and automatic licensing, which are 
included in All NTBs 
•  UNCTAD data is reported as Core NTBs prior to 1999 and All NTBs after 
1999.  Due to this definitional change, historical data is not available in 
UNCTAD (2001) and one cannot average the frequency of NTBs for the 
entire period of 1990-1999. 
•  Our NTB data is extremely limited.  Michalopoulos (1999) is the most 
comprehensive source we could locate.  However, it is limited to developing 
countries, thereby excluding all of Western Europe and North America.  It APPENDIX 1 
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Variable Description  Dates  Sources  Comments 
includes the 1989-1994 NTB averages and 1995-1998 averages.  We relied 
on the data from 1995-1998.  However, the dataset only contains data for 29 
countries and is missing data for 112 countries in our dataset.  In the case of 
the countries with missing data, they are classified as open on the basis of 
the NTB criterion.  50 the countries for which we are missing data are 
classified as open on the basis of the OPEN90-99 criteria AND are NOT 
Western European or North American (regions which we assume have NTBs 
< 40%.) 
Black Market 
Premium (BMP) 
Period average of annual 
BMP:  [(Parallel market 
exchange rate/ official 
exchange rate )– 1] * 100 
 
Dummy = 1 if  BMP > 20% 
 
1990-
1999 
Easterly, 
William and 
Mirvat Sewadeh 
(2000) 
•  The primary source of BMP data used by SW (Cowitt, 1986, World 
Currency Yearbook) has not been updated to include the entire period of 
1990-1999.  We rely on data from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002), which is a 
compilation of various sources.  While this appears to be the most 
comprehensive source available, its coverage is limited.   
•  BMP data from Easterly and Sewadeh (2002), our primary source for 
updating BMP data, is lacking for the following countries: Belarus, 
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.  We classified Uzbekistan as closed on the basis 
of its dual exchange rate regime.  Belarus is closed on the basis of other 
criteria, however, Tajikistan is classified as open, but is missing  BMP, TAR, 
and NTB data.   
•  In the case of five other CIS countries, (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova, we have very limited data.  Based on the 
Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) data, the BMP was 0 in 1999 in all these 
countries. However, there are no other data points for the entire decade 
(1990-98).  Based on this limited BMP data (and missing TAR and NTB 
data), all five are all classified as open in 1990-1999.  
XMB  Dummy = 1 if country 
maintained an export 
marketing board or similar 
monopoly on exports 
1999 IMF  Country 
Reports (various 
issues) 
WTO Trade 
Policy Reviews 
(various issues) 
•  Includes all countries - NOT limited to strictly African countries, as in SW 
•  We chose to base the XMB variable on countries’ 1999 status for  two 
reasons:  first,  this is consistent with the SW XMB variable which was 
based  on 1991 status (near the end of their period), second, the majority of 
countries that abolished export marketing boards did so during the first half 
of the decade
1 
SOC  Dummy = 1 if the Communist 
Party maintained undivided 
power 
1999 IMF  Country 
Reports (various 
issues) 
Economist 
Intelligence Unit 
 
•  Definition of a Socialist state is that employed by Kornai (1992) which was 
the basis of the Sachs Warner dummy 
•  We chose to base the SOC variable on countries’ 1999 status for two 
reasons:  first,  this is consistent with the SW SOC variable which was based 
1987 status (near the end of their period), second, the Eastern European and 
New Independent States of the former USSR opened based on the SOC 
criterion during the early 1990s. 
                                                 
1 See Appendix 3 for dates and more specific information. APPENDIX 1 
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SW Variables 
Variable Description  Dates  Sources  Comments 
Tariffs (TAR)  Own-import weighted average 
tariff rate on capital goods 
intermediates  
Dummy = 1 if  TAR > 40% 
1985-88 UNCTAD  data 
from Barro 
and Lee (1994) 
 
Non-Tariff 
Barriers (NTB) 
Average own-import weighted 
nontariff frequency on capital 
goods and intermediates.  
Includes licensing, 
prohibitions, and quotas. 
Dummy = 1 if NTB > 40% 
1985-88 UNCTAD  data 
from Barro 
and Lee (1994) 
 
Black Market 
Premium 
(BMP70 and 
BMP80) 
Period average of annual 
BMP:  [(Parallel market 
exchange rate/ official 
exchange rate)– 1] 
Dummy = 1 if either BMP70 
OR BMP80 > 0.2 
BMP70 
= 1970-
1979 
BMP80 
= 1980-
1989 
Cowitt (1986) 
with updates 
from World 
Bank data 
(supplied by 
Ross Levine). 
 
XMB  Dummy = 1 if country was 
included in the World Bank 
(1994 ) study and scored a 4 
on the study’s export 
marketing index in 1991. 
1991 World  Bank 
(1994) 
World Bank (1994):  Adjustment in Africa:  Reforms, Results, and the Road 
Ahead was limited to African countries that had been involved in a World Bank 
or IMF structural adjustment program between 1987 and 1991. 
SOC  Dummy = 1 if classified as 
socialist in Kornai (1992, table 
1.1) 
1987 Kornai  (1992)   
OPEN  Dummy = 1 for all open 
countries 
Dummy = 0 if a country 
scored a 1 on any of the 
above:  TAR, NTB, BMP70, 
BMP80, XMB, OR SOC 
 
    The following adjustments were made to the OPEN dummy, as discussed 
(Sachs Warner, 1995, pp. 66-67) 
•  Morocco, South Africa, Haiti, and New Zealand were changed from Open to 
Closed 
•  The following were assigned “missing” values due to insufficient data: 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Cape Verde, Comoros, Liberia, Iceland, Fiji, Malta, 
Panama, Seychelles, and Suriname 
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B. Sources and description of the variables used in the regressions 
 
Cross-sectional Regressions (Section 3) 
GROWTH   Real per capita growth rate of GDP per year: e.g.: G7089 = [In(GDP89) - In(GDP70)]/19. Periods: 1970-1989, 1970-1980, 1980-1989, 
1989-1998. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
LRGDPCH   Real GDP per capita in (1996 international prices) Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
LIBER_SW_1970-89  Openness indicator for 1970-1989. See the text for an explanation of its construction. Sachs and Warner (1995). 
LIBER_SW_xx  Cross-sectional openness indicator constructed from Sachs and Warner’s liberalization dates, for xx=1970, 1980, 1989. 
LIBER_WW_1990-99  Openness indicator for 1990-1999, constructed by Wacziarg and Welch. See the text for an explanation of its construction. 
POL  Composite dummy variable indicating extreme political repression and unrest. Source: Sachs and Warner (1995) 
SEC   Secondary school enrollment rate, 1970, 1980, 1985. Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
PRI  Primary school enrollment rate, 1970, 1980, 1985. Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
GVXDXE   Ratio of real government “consumption” spending net of spending on the military and education, to real GDP, averaged 1970-1984 
Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
CG  Ratio of real government consumption expenditures to real GDP, for periods 1970-1980, 1980-1989, 1989-1998. Source: Heston, 
Summers and Aten (2002). 
REVCOUP   Number of revolutions and coups per year, averaged over period,  1970-85. Source: Barro and Lee (1994). 
REVOL  Number of revolutions per year, averaged over the periods 1970-1980, 1980-1989, 1989-1998. Source: Banks (2001). 
ASSASS  Number of assassinations per million population per year, averaged over the relevant period, 1970-85, 1970-1980, 1980-1989, 1989-
1999. Source: Banks (2001) 
PPIDEV   The deviation of the log of the price level of investment (PPP investment divided by exchange rate relative to the United States) from 
the cross-country sample mean in 1970. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
INV  Ratio of real gross domestic investment (public and private) to real GDP, averaged over the period 1970-89. Source: Barro and Lee 
(1994) who, in turn, used Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
DENSI   Population (in thousands) divided by land area (in square meters), 1960, 1970, 1980. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) 
(population data) and CIA World Factbook (land area) 
Fixed-Effects Regressions (Section 4) 
GROWTH  Real per capita growth rate of GDP per year (annual data). Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
INVESTMENT  Investment rate. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
OPENNESS  Ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. Source: Heston, Summers and Aten (2002). 
 APPENDIX 2-A
Data on Trade Policy
WB 
Code Country OPEN90-99
1
Avg. Tariff (%)
2
Core Non-
Tariff Barriers 
(%)
 3
Black Market 
Premium (%)
 4
Export 
Marketing 
Board
 5 Socialist
 5
1 = Open;    
0 = Closed
1990-1999 
(average)
1995-1998 
(average)
1990-1999 
(average)
ALB Albania 1 15.9 7.53 0 0
DZA Algeria 0 23.97 177.91 0 0
AGO Angola 0  23.62 0 0
ARG Argentina 1 12.54 2.10 9.30 0 0
ARM Armenia 1    0.00 0 0
AUS Australia 1 7.91  0.00 0 0
AUT Austria 1 6.91 0.00 0 0
AZE Azerbaijan 1    0.00 0 0
BGD Bangladesh 0 43.70  83.27 0 0
BRB Barbados 1 15.58  2.31 0 0
BLR Belarus 0 12.63  n/a 1 0
BEL Belgium 1 6.91  0.00 0 0
BEN Benin 1 28.61 1.00 1.93 0 0
BOL Bolivia 1 10.34  1.49 0 0
BWA Botswana 1 20.55  7.82 0 0
BRA Brazil 1 17.32 21.60 13.76 0 0
BGR Bulgaria 1 17.37  7.44 0 0
BFA Burkina Faso 1 29.13   1.98 0 0
BDI Burundi 0 7.40  29.55 0 0
CMR Cameroon 1 18.43  1.98 0 0
CAN Canada 1 6.81  0.00 0 0
CPV Cape Verde 1 22.05   0.00 0 0
CAF Central African Republic 0 12.80   1.55 1 0
TCD Chad 0 15.80  1.98 1 0
CHL Chile 1 11.33 5.20 9.84 0 0
CHN China 0 31.06  35.89 0 1
COL Colombia 1 14.30 10.30 8.87 0 0
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. 0 25.47   34.67 1 0
COG Congo, Rep. 0 17.97   1.98 1 0
CRI Costa Rica 1 10.60 6.20 5.37 0 0
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 1 22.00 30.90 1.98 0 0
HRV Croatia 0    37.76 0 0
CYP Cyprus 1 10.64 21.60 2.16 0 0
CZE Czech Republic 1 6.08   0.22 0 0
DNK Denmark 1 6.91  0.00 0 0
DOM Dominican Republic 1 16.70 6.20 16.31 0 0
ECU Ecuador 1 11.29  9.34 0 0
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. 1 30.23   12.45 0 0
SLV El Salvador 1 9.38 5.20 13.59 0 0
EST Estonia 0 1.12  25.09 0 0
ETH Ethiopia 0 22.55  111.43 0 0
FIN Finland 1 6.91  0.00 0 0
FRA France 1 6.91  0.00 0 0
GAB Gabon 0 19.87  1.98 1 0
GMB Gambia, The 1 13.55   4.69 0 0
GEO Georgia 1    0.00 0 0
DEU Germany 1 6.91  0.00 0 0
GHA Ghana 1 14.93  2.96 0 0
GRC Greece 1 6.91  1.24 0 0
GTM Guatemala 1 10.27  6.03 0 0
GIN Guinea 1    3.99 0 0
GNB Guinea-Bissau 1    0.00 0 0
GUY Guyana 0 13.70  28.23 0 0
HTI Haiti 0 10.00  81.12 0 0
HND Honduras 1 8.90  9.21 0 0
HKG Hong Kong, China 1   2.10 -0.02 0 0
HUN Hungary 1 12.11  5.40 0 0
ISL Iceland 1 3.98  1.24 0 0
IND India 0 48.65 93.80 7.45 0 0
IDN Indonesia 1 16.27 31.30 7.10 0 0
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. 0     1,199.31          0 0
IRQ Iraq 0    138,935.90      0 0
IRL Ireland 1 3.98  2.50 0 0
ISR Israel 1 7.80  2.09 0 0
ITA Italy 1 6.91  0.00 0 0
JAM Jamaica 1 14.68  15.46 0 0
JPN Japan 1 5.98  -0.35 0 0
JOR Jordan 1 15.83  3.37 0 0
KAZ Kazakhstan 0    55.34 0 0
KEN Kenya 1 27.47  15.94 0 0
KOR Korea, Rep. 1 11.28 25.00 0.03 0 0
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic 1     n/a 0 0
LVA Latvia 1 5.73  7.29 0 0
LSO Lesotho 1 17.40  3.49 0 0
LBR Liberia 0    2,306.86          0 0
LTU Lituania 1 4.33  7.45 0 0
LUX Luxembourg 1 6.91  0.38 0 0
MKD Macedonia, FYR 1     18.45 0 0
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Data on Trade Policy
WB 
Code Country OPEN90-99
1
Avg. Tariff (%)
2
Core Non-
Tariff Barriers 
(%)
 3
Black Market 
Premium (%)
 4
Export 
Marketing 
Board
 5 Socialist
 5
1 = Open;    
0 = Closed
1990-1999 
(average)
1995-1998 
(average)
1990-1999 
(average)
MDG Madagascar 1 7.13  5.93 0 0
MWI Malawi 0 19.80  28.83 0 0
MYS Malaysia 1 11.70 19.60 1.35 0 0
MLI Mali 1 15.66  1.98 0 0
MLT Malta 1 7.23  1.20 0 0
MRT Mauritania 1 28.23  1.55 0 0
MUS Mauritius 1 27.00 16.70 5.25 0 0
MEX Mexico 1 12.53 13.40 2.24 0 0
MDA Moldova 1    0.00 0 0
MAR Morocco 1 23.75 13.40 3.54 0 0
MOZ Mozambique 1 16.25  6.87 0 0
MMR Myanmar 0 5.70  2,280.77          0 0
NPL Nepal 0 15.28  24.23 0 0
NLD Netherlands 1 6.91  0.00 0 0
NZL New Zealand 1 6.35   2.50 0 0
NIC Nicaragua 1 9.90  9.98 0 0
NER Niger 1 18.30  1.87 0 0
NGA Nigeria 0 29.74 11.50 151.32 0 0
NOR Norway 1 4.87  0.00 0 0
PAK Pakistan 0 54.73  9.74 0 0
PAN Panama 1 10.67  0.00 0 0
PNG Papua New Guinea 0 16.67   16.57 1 0
PRY Paraguay 1 10.91 0.00 11.83 0 0
PER Peru 1 16.80  8.75 0 0
PHL Philippines 1 19.09  4.36 0 0
POL Poland 1 12.46  2.42 0 0
PRT Portugal 1 6.91  2.04 0 0
ROM Romania 0 13.50  104.30 0 0
RUS Russian Ferderation 0 11.24   50,979.69        1 0
RWA Rwanda 0 38.40  50.78 0 0
SEN Senegal 0 13.05  1.98 1 0
SLE Sierra Leone 0 30.25   61.47 0 0
SGP Singapore 1 0.32 2.10 0.80 0 0
SVK Slovak Republic 1 7.35   5.34 0 0
SVN Slovenia 1 10.60  10.06 0 0
SOM Somalia 0    246.55 0 0
ZAF South Africa 1 9.05 8.30 3.46 0 0
ESP Spain 1 6.91  1.71 0 0
LKA Sri Lanka 1 24.34 22.70 7.84 0 0
SWZ Swaziland 1 15.10  7.62 0 0
SWE Sweden 1 6.91  0.00 0 0
CHE Switzerland 1 1.38  0.00 0 0
SYR Syrian Arab Republic 0 16.00   279.97 0 0
TWN Taiwan, China 1 9.85   0.95 0 0
TJK Tajikistan 1    n/a 0 0
TZA Tanzania 0 25.12  22.17 0 0
THA Thailand 1 29.54 17.50 1.80 0 0
TGO Togo 0 15.25  1.98 1 0
TTO Trinidad and Tobago 1 14.86   13.22 0 0
TUN Tunisia 1 28.25  3.67 0 0
TUR Turkey 1 15.28 19.80 1.15 0 0
TKM Turkmenistan 0    42.86 1 0
UGA Uganda 1 14.37 3.10 19.33 0 0
UKR Ukraine 0 9.73  9.02 1 0
GBR United Kingdom 1 6.91   0.00 0 0
USA United States 1 5.96   0.00 0 0
URY Uruguay 1 14.00 0.00 9.88 0 0
UZB Uzbekistan 0    dual x rt. 00
VEN Venezuela 1 14.31 17.70 4.13 0 0
YEM Yemen, Rep. 1 20.00   8.34 0 0
YUG Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/Montenegro) 0     106.44 0 0
ZMB Zambia 0 18.43 1.00 62.55 0 0
ZWE Zimbabwe 0 20.43  132.81 0 0
Notes
1 Based on application of Sachs Warner criteria.  See Appendices 1 and 3 for further information
2 Unweighted average tariff, 1990-99.  Sources:  UNCTAD (2001), World Bank (2000), WTO (various trade policy reviews)
3 Core non-tariff barrier frequency on capital good and intermediates; includes quotas, licensing, prohibitions, and administered pricing.  Source: Michalopoulos (1999)
4 [[(parallel Xrate/official Xrate) – 1]*100]  Source:  Easterly and Sewadeh (2000)
5 Based on literature reviews.  See Appendix 3 for further information
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Trade Liberalization Dates
WB 
Code Country
Periods of 
Temporary 
Liberalization 
(if applicable)
Sachs and 
Warner 
(1995)
Wacziarg 
and Welch
ALB Albania 1992 1992
DZA Algeria n/a n/a
AGO Angola n/a n/a
ARG Argentina 1991 1991
ARM Armenia n/a 1995
AUS Australia 1964 1964
AUT Austria 1960 1960
AZE Azerbaijan n/a 1995
BGD Bangladesh n/a 1996
BRB Barbados 1966 1966
BLR Belarus 1994 n/a
BEL Belgium 1959 1959
BEN Benin 1990 1990
BOL Bolivia 1956-79 1985 1985
BWA Botswana 1979 1979
BRA Brazil 1991 1991
BGR Bulgaria 1991 1991
BFA Burkina Faso n/a 1998
BDI Burundi n/a 1999
CMR Cameroon 1993 1993
CAN Canada 1952 1952
CPV Cape Verde n/a 1991
CAF Central African Republic n/a n/a
TCD Chad n/a n/a
CHL Chile 1976 1976
CHN China n/a n/a
COL Colombia 1986 1986
ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep. n/a n/a
COG Congo, Rep. n/a n/a
CRI Costa Rica 1952-61 1986 1986
CIV Cote d'Ivoire n/a 1994
HRV Croatia 1993 n/a
CYP Cyprus 1960 1960
CZE Czech Republic 1991 1991
DNK Denmark 1959 1959
DOM Dominican Republic n/a 1992
ECU Ecuador 1950-82 1991 1991
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. n/a 1995
SLV El Salvador 1950-61 1989 1989
EST Estonia 1992 n/a
ETH Ethiopia n/a 1996
FIN Finland 1960 1960
FRA France 1959 1959
GAB Gabon n/a n/a
GMB Gambia, The 1985 1985
GEO Georgia n/a 1996
DEU Germany 1959 1959
GHA Ghana 1985 1985
GRC Greece 1959 1959
GTM Guatemala 1950-61 1988 1988
GIN Guinea 1986 1986
GNB Guinea-Bissau 1987 1987
GUY Guyana 1988 1988
HTI Haiti n/a n/a
HND Honduras 1950-61 1991 1991
HKG Hong Kong, China Always Always
HUN Hungary 1990 1990
ISL Iceland n/a n/a
IND India 1994 n/a
IDN Indonesia 1970 1970
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. n/a n/a
IRQ Iraq n/a n/a
IRL Ireland 1966 1966
ISR Israel 1985 1985
ITA Italy 1959 1959
JAM Jamaica 1962-1973 1989 1989
JPN Japan 1964 1964
JOR Jordan 1965 1965
KAZ Kazakhstan n/a n/a
KEN Kenya 1963-67 1993 1993
KOR Korea, Rep. 1968 1968
KGZ Kyrgyz Republic 1994 1994
LVA Latvia 1993 1993
Year Uninterrupted 
Openness Began (if 
applicable) 
1,2
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Trade Liberalization Dates
WB 
Code Country
Periods of 
Temporary 
Liberalization 
(if applicable)
Sachs and 
Warner 
(1995)
Wacziarg 
and Welch
Year Uninterrupted 
Openness Began (if 
applicable) 
1,2
LSO Lesotho n/a n/a
LBR Liberia n/a n/a
LTU Lituania 1993 1993
LUX Luxembourg 1959 1959
MKD Macedonia, FYR 1994 1994
MDG Madagascar n/a 1996
MWI Malawi n/a n/a
MYS Malaysia 1963 1963
MLI Mali 1988 1988
MLT Malta n/a n/a
MRT Mauritania 1992 1995
MUS Mauritius 1968 1968
MEX Mexico 1986 1986
MDA Moldova 1994 1994
MAR Morocco 1956-64 1984 1984
MOZ Mozambique n/a 1995
MMR Myanmar n/a n/a
NPL Nepal 1991 1991
NLD Netherlands 1959 1959
NZL New Zealand 1986 1986
NIC Nicaragua 1950-60 1991 1991
NER Niger n/a 1994
NGA Nigeria n/a n/a
NOR Norway Always Always
PAK Pakistan n/a 2001
PAN Panama n/a 1996
PNG Papua New Guinea n/a n/a
PRY Paraguay 1989 1989
PER Peru 1948-67 1991 1991
PHL Philippines 1988 1988
POL Poland 1990 1990
PRT Portugal Always Always
ROM Romania 1992 1992
RUS Russian Ferderation n/a n/a
RWA Rwanda n/a n/a
SEN Senegal n/a n/a
SLE Sierra Leone n/a 2001
SGP Singapore 1965 1965
SVK Slovak Republic 1991 1991
SVN Slovenia 1991 1991
SOM Somalia n/a n/a
ZAF South Africa 1991 1991
ESP Spain 1959 1959
LKA Sri Lanka 1950-56; 77-83 1991 1991
SWZ Swaziland n/a n/a
SWE Sweden 1960 1960
CHE Switzerland Always Always
SYR Syrian Arab Republic 1950-65 n/a n/a
TWN Taiwan, China 1963 1963
TJK Tajikistan n/a 1996
TZA Tanzania n/a 1995
THA Thailand Always Always
TGO Togo n/a n/a
TTO Trinidad and Tobago n/a 1992
TUN Tunisia 1989 1989
TUR Turkey 1950-53 1989 1989
TKM Turkmenistan n/a n/a
UGA Uganda 1988 1988
UKR Ukraine n/a n/a
GBR United Kingdom Always Always
USA United States Always Always
URY Uruguay 1990 1990
UZB Uzbekistan n/a n/a
VEN Venezuela 1950-59; 89-93 n/a 1996
YEM Yemen, Rep. Always Always
YUG Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/Montenegro) n/a 2001
ZMB Zambia 1993 1993
ZWE Zimbabwe n/a n/a
Notes
1 Based on latest date of uninterrupted openness
2 Based on the Sachs Warner criteria along with broader literature review.  See Appe
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APPENDIX  3 – A 
Country Summaries of Trade Policy Changes During the 1990s 
 
Albania  Open since 1992 (Sachs and Warner, 1995; EBRD, 1994).  Albania’s black 
market premium averaged 8% between 1996 and 1999 (Easterly and Sewadeh, 
2002).  We have limited tariff and lack NTB data.  However, the average 
unweighted tariff in 1997 was 15.9%.  Its state trading monopoly was removed 
in 1992 (EBRD, 1997). 
 
Algeria  Closed based on black market exchange rate premium.  Economic liberalization 
that began in the mid-1980s has included trade promotion and devaluation of the 
dinar.  However, reforms have slowed since a financial crisis in 1992 (EIU). 
 
Angola  Closed based on black market exchange rate premium.  Angola was declared a 
socialist country in 1977 when the Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
gained power.  The country is engulfed in civil conflict that erupted in 1975 and 
has continued despite attempts to implement peace agreements in 1991 and 
1994.  The structures of a socialist economic system remain, including 
numerous parastatals, an overvalued foreign exchange rate, price controls, and 
rationed import licenses (Paulson, 1999). 
 
Armenia  Open since 1995.  According to EBRD (1997), Armenia has one of the most 
liberal trade regimes among the CIS countries.  Armenia has both liberal trade 
and foreign exchange regimes.  Import duties are limited to a uniform 10% rate 
and NTBs are levied strictly for technical, health and safety reasons  (IMF, 
2001a).  The country has no black market premium.   Currency export surrender 
requirements were eliminated in 1995 (EBRD, 1997). 
 
Azerbaijan  Open since 1995.  Since gaining independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, 
Azerbaijan has implemented market and trade liberalization policies.  In 1995, a 
unified exchange rate was instituted and the differentiated surrender prices at 
sub-market prices were abolished.  Import tariffs range from 0-15% and NTBs 
have been nearly entirely abolished.  State-owned trading companies involved in 
importing and exporting goods, including the cotton monopoly, have been either 
privatized or liquidated, the majority by 1994  (IMF, 1998a; EBRD, 1997). 
 
Bangladesh  Open since 1996.  However, based on the OPEN90-99 dummy, Bangladesh is 
considered closed because it exceeded the decade-long tariff and black market 
premium criteria.  Its average tariff rate between 1990 and 1999 was 44% and it 
black market premium averaged 83% (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).  In 1996, 
Bangladesh’s black market exchange rate premium fell below 20%.  As of 2000, 
Bangladesh still had relatively high levels of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, 
however they did not exceed the Sachs and Warner criteria.  Bangladesh’s 
average tariff rate was 20.7% and non-tariff barrier coverage was 9.8% 
(UNCTAD, 2001). 
 
Belarus  Closed.   Belarus has not made substantial gains in trade liberalization  (EBRD, 
1997).  The Belarusian economy is highly dollarized and maintains a multiple 
exchange rate system.  In the beginning of 2000, the black market exchange rate 
premium was 300% (IMF, 2000).  Agriculture remains highly centralized and 
the state is responsible for establishing price, margin, and trade controls and 
procuring crop and livestock products  (IMF, 2000a).  We conclude that such 
monopoly powers constitute an export monopoly similar to an export marketing 
board.  
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  Note that Sachs and Warner (1995) cite that Belarus opened in 1994.  However, 
the Sachs and Warner paper classifies the Post-Communist countries strictly on 
the basis of EBRD (1994) standards of openness that do not include the black 
market premium.  We lack black market premium data for Belarus except for the 
data from the IMF noted above.  However, based on the multiple exchange rate 
system and the export marketing monopoly, we classify Belarus as never open. 
 
Bulgaria  Open since 1991 (Sachs and Warner, 1995; EBRD, 1994).  Its black market 
premium has averaged only 6% between 1990-1999.  Its unweighted average 
tariff was 16.6% and 17.6% in 1997 and 1998, respectively (World Bank, 2000).  
The tariff rate was reduced to 13.8% and 12.4% in 2000 and 2001, respectively  
(IMF, 2001).  While quantitative restrictions and other NTBs remained through 
1997, they had been eliminated by 2000 (IMF, 2001b).  However, such barriers 
had already been reduced to minimal levels by 1991 (EBRD, 1997). 
 
Burkina Faso  Open since 1998.  Cotton, Burkina Faso’s primary export industry, has been 
gradually liberalized since 1998.  The state sold 30% of its cotton monopoly 
SOFITEX to producers’ associations and retains minority (36%) control (IMF, 
2002a).  It maintains an export monopoly on the distribution, but not export, of 
petroleum products and therefore satisfies the Sachs Warner (1995) marketing 
board criteria. 
 
In 1998, Burkina Faso and the other nations included in the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) introduced a common external tariff 
and reduced internal tariffs.  Maximum overall tariffs were reduced from 37% to 
29%.  By 2000, the CET was 5-20%, depending on specific products, and 
internal tariffs had been eliminated (IMF, 2000b). 
 
Burundi  Open since 1999.  In 1999, Burundi’s black market exchange rate premium fell 
below 20% (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).  The marketing monopoly of the 
Burundi Coffee Company (BCC) was abolished in 1993 and replaced by an 
auction system in which private exporters participate (IMF, 1997).  The 
literature does not refer to tariff or other non-tariff barriers such as quotas or 
explicit bans. 
 
Cape Verde  Open since 1991.  There is limited data on Cape Verde.  It implemented an 
economic and trade liberalization program in 1991.  Its average unweighted 
tariff was 24.1% in 1996 and 20% in 1997, the only two years for which tariff 
data is available (World Bank, 2000).  The state monopolies on importing sugar, 
oils, corn, and rice were abolished through trade reforms in 1999.  Quantitative 
export restrictions were also replaced with customs duties in 1999  (IMF, 
1999a).  However, based strictly on the Sachs Warner criteria, it appears that 
Cape Verde should be classified as open during the early 1990s when the 
liberalization program initially reduced tariffs and NTBs. 
 
Central African Republic  Remains closed.  Based on the IMF (2001c), the Central African Republic is in 
the process of liberalization.  According to this Letter of Intent, the cotton 
agency remains a public monopoly and the sugar trade regime is to be 
liberalized in 2002 (IMF 2001c).  Therefore, there is not yet sufficient evidence 
to classify C.A.R. as an open economy. 
 
Chad  Remains closed.  Based on the IMF Letter of Intent (1999b), while some 
progress was made toward liberalizing the economy over the 1995-1999 period, 
the structural reform program, including privatization of the state’s sugar and 
cotton monopolies, has yet to be implemented.  Like Sachs and Warner (1995), 
we were unable to obtain tariff or non-tariff barrier data.   41
 
China  Remains closed based on the undivided power of the Communist Party and its 
black market exchange rate premium, which averaged 36% between 1990-1999  
(Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).  In addition, China had a relatively high average 
tariff rate, 31%, between 1990-1999, however this does not exceed the Sachs 
Warner criterion. 
 
Congo (Dem. Rep)  Remains closed based on black market exchange rate premium and export 
marketing board.   In 1993, the government abolished marketing monopolies for 
cocoa and coffee, timber, and other products (Paulson, 1999).  However, 
GECAMINES, the public enterprise responsible for copper and cobalt 
production  retains an export monopoly.  In 2000, the state instituted monopoly 
control over diamond exports (IMF, 2001d). 
 
Congo (Republic of)  Remains closed.  A former Socialist country, Congo completed a transition to a 
multi-party democracy in 1992.  Armed conflict throughout the late 1990s has 
limited economic reform.  While economic liberalization is planned for 1999-
2002, there is insufficient progress to date (IMF, 2000d). 
 
Cote d’Ivoire  Open since 1994.  In 1994, the state export promotion agency CCIA was 
replaced by  a new private export promotion agency, APEXCI.  In addition, 
CIASTAB, or external cocoa and coffee marketing board, was also reformed to 
allow more private sector participation (Devarajan et al, 2001). SW classified 
Côte d'Ivoire as closed as of the end of 1994, but we found that it liberalized in 
1994 based on the reform of state marketing boards. 
 
Croatia  Closed based on black market premium, which averaged 38% between 1990 and 
1999 (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).  Croatia has a relatively liberal trade regime 
based on the other openness indicators and the EBRD (1997).  All import quotas 
were abolished between 1994 and 1996.  Croatia’s simple average tariff is 
12.1% and its weighted average is 9% (IMF, 2000e). 
  
  Our classification of Croatia as closed differs from the Sachs and Warner (1995) 
paper which cited Croatia as open since 1993.  However, the Sachs and Warner 
paper classifies the Post-Communist countries strictly based on the EBRD 
(1994) standards of openness which do not include the black market premium.  
We lack black market premium data for Croatia prior to 1996 and therefore 
cannot ascertain whether a temporary period of liberalization existed or if 
Croatia was never open based on the complete Sachs and Warner criteria. 
 
Czech Republic  Open since 1991 (Sachs and Warner, 1995; EBRD, 1994).  According to the 
WTO, trade liberalization has been an import part of the country’s overall 
economic reform during the latter 1990s (WTO, 2001c).  The country is well-
integrated into the open economy:  its merchandise (exports and imports) to 
GDP ration was 120% in 2000.  Its average MFN tariff rate was 6% in 2001 and 
the country has relatively few NTBs.  However, the Czech Republic continues to 
impose higher tariffs on agricultural goods:  the MFN tariff rate for agricultural 
products was 13.4% in 2001 (WTO, 2001c).  Its overall average unweighted 
tariff averaged 6.1% for the period 1986 through 1999 (World Bank, 2000).   
 
Dominican Republic  Open since 1992.  Trade liberalization began in the early 1990s and the black 
market exchange rate premium fell below 20% in 1992.  While we lack tariff 
data prior to 1994, the Dominican Republic had reduced its average tariff rate to  
17.8% in 1994.  As part of its agreement to join the WTO in 1995, the 
Dominican Republic agreed to further reduce average tariffs, introduce a 
maximum tariff rate of 40%  and  eliminate all nontariff barriers (IMF, 1999c).   42
SW classified the Dominican Republic as closed as of 1994. However, the black 
market premium fell below the 20% threshold and the country continuously 
satisfied all criteria for the first time in 1992.  
 
Egypt  Open since 1995.  Egypt launched an economic stabilization and trade 
liberalization program in 1990/91.  According to the WTO (1999a), a great deal 
of progress was made in gradually reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers 
between 1991 and 1999.  We date Egypt’s openness to 1995, a rough midpoint 
of this liberalization period.  However, admittedly, this is a somewhat arbitrary 
date in the absence of a discrete policy change that resulted in Egypt satisfying 
the Sachs Warner criteria. 
 
Egypt’s black market premium decreased from 70% to 10% between 1990-1991 
(Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).  However, it maintained high tariff and non-tariff 
barriers.  Its core NTBs averaged 57.3% between 1989 and 1994 
(Michalopoulus, 1999).  Unweighted tariff rates averaged 42.2% in 1991 before 
falling to 28.3% in 1994 (World Bank, 2000).  Egypt continues to maintain a 
relatively restrictive trade regime.  Its average tariff rate during the period 1995-
1999 was 26.1%; its non-tariff measures covered 28.8% of trade (UNCTAD, 
2001). 
 
Estonia  Closed based on black market premium, which averaged 25% between 1996 and 
1999 (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).  Based on UNCTAD (2001) data, its tariff 
rate averaged 1% between 1995 and 1999 and it did not employ NTBs during 
the period (UNCTAD, 2001; EBRD, 1997). 
 
Our classification of Estonia as closed differs from the Sachs and Warner (1995) 
paper which cited it as open since 1992.  However, the Sachs and Warner paper 
classifies the Post-Communist countries strictly based on the EBRD (1994) 
standards of openness which do not include the black market premium. 
 
Ethiopia  Open since 1996.  Economic liberalization began in 1990; in 1991 the socialist 
Derg regime lost power.  In 1994, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
was created and in 1995 elections held.  In 1996, the government entered into an 
IMF Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility which included measures to 
liberalize the country’s trade regime.  The majority of export taxes were 
eliminated; the parastatal monopoly in coffee marketing was effectively 
abolished; and maximum import duties were lowered to 40%.  The currency, the 
birr, was allowed to float, thereby resulting in the convergence of the official, 
auction, and parallel market exchange rates (Devarajan et al, 2001). 
 
Gabon  Remains Closed.  Based on the WTO (2001d) and IMF (2000f ), it appears that 
trade liberalization is not proceeding very rapidly and that sufficient progress 
has yet to be made.  The state retains monopoly power in several export 
industries, most notably the petroleum industry.  Its tariff barriers averaged 20% 
during the 1990s (World Bank, 2000). 
 
Georgia  Open since 1996, when quantitative restrictions on exports were substantially 
removed (EBRD, 1997).  Georgia’s simple average tariff rate was 10.9% in 
2001 (IMF, 2001e).  Georgia did not have a black market premium, based on 
(Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).   
 
Haiti  Remains closed based on the Sachs Warner black market exchange rate 
criterion.  Its BMP averaged 81% between 1990 and 1999 (Easterly and 
Sewadeh, 2002).  Based on the other openness criteria, however, Haiti has a 
highly liberal trade regime.  According to the IMF (2001f), Haiti has one of the   43
most liberal trade regimes.  In the Western Hemisphere, only Chile and Panama 
have similarly liberal trade regimes, based on the IMF’s 1999 index of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. 
 
Iceland  Open.  Insufficient historical data to assign date of opening.  Iceland is highly 
dependent on foreign trade; its merchandise trade to GDP ratio was over 50% in 
1999 (WTO, 2000a).  According to the WTO, its average MFN tariff rate was 
4% in 1999 and non-tariff barriers were limited. 
 
India  SW classified India as open since 1994. However, India did not satisfy the tariff 
openness criteria until 1996 when its average tariff rate fell from 41.0% to 
38.6% (World Bank, http://www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/TR_data.html) 
Based on India's core NTBs, which averaged a frequency of 93.8% between 
1995-1998, we classify India as closed over the entire 1990s decade (see 
Michalopoulos (1999)). India's nontariff barriers have been recently reduced 
below the 40% coverage rate, although these measures seem to have been 
replaced with a flurry of phytosanitary measures and antidumping duties. We 
lack comparable data to pass definitive judgment on the level of Indian NTBs 
after 1998. See Wacziarg (2003) for data suggesting that India is still roughly 
twice as closed as China, on a variety of measures of trade openness. 
 
  While significant trade liberalization occurred in 1994 (Sachs and Warner 1995, 
TIDE, 1994), this liberalization involved primarily reducing tariff and foreign 
exchange trade barriers (TIDE, 1994).  Liberalization since 1997 has focused 
more on decreasing NTBs.  Due to a WTO-ruling, India was required to remove 
all QRs by April, 2001.  However, according to the IMF (2001g), “a number of 
(other) NTBs have been retained and in some cases enhanced.”  We lack 
specific data regarding the current level of NTBs. 
 
Iran  Remains closed based on its black market exchange rate premium, which 
averaged 1,199 % between 1990 and 1999 (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).   
 
Iraq  Remains closed based on black market exchange rate premium, which averaged 
138,936% between 1990 and 1999 (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).   
 
Kazakhstan  Closed based on black market premium.  However, Kazakhstan has a liberal 
trade regime, based on other indicators.  During 1995, all export quotas and 
most licensing requirements were abolished.    Import tariffs were reduced 
substantially in 1995 and by 1997 had fallen to 12% (weighted average).  
Monopoly rights of state trading organizations were abolished in 1994 (EBRD, 
1997). 
 
Kyrgyz Republic  Open since 1994  (Sachs and Warner, 1995; EBRD, 1994).  According to the 
IMF (2000g), the Kyrgyz Republic engaged in rapid liberalization following its 
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and is currently one of the most 
open countries in among the Baltics, Russia, and other CIS countries.  Between 
1994 and 1998, the Kyrgyz Republic had a uniform 10% tariff on all imports.  It 
implemented a multi-level tariff structure in 1999 and the average tariff was 
reduced to 9.18% in 1999 and 5.21% in 2000 (IMF, 2000g).  NTMs are limited 
and are employed only for security and safety measures. 
 
Latvia  Open since 1993 (Sachs and Warner, 1995; European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 1994).  Its black market premium averaged 0.07% between 
1996 and 1999 and its average tariff over the 1995-1999 period was 4.2%. It 
lacked NTBs in 1999 (UNCTAD, 2001). 
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Lesotho  Not rated.  Insufficient data on trade policy. 
 
Liberia  Closed based on black market exchange rate premium. 
 
Lithuania  Open since 1993  (Sachs and Warner, 1995; European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 1994).  Lithuania’s average tariff over the 1995-1999 period 
was 3.5% and it lacked NTBs in 1999 (UNCTAD, 2001).  Its black market 
premium averaged 7% between 1996 and 1999 (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).   
 
Macedonia (FYR)  Open since 1994   (Sachs and Warner, 1995; European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 1994).  In 1996, it implemented further trade liberalization, 
decreasing its average unweighted tariff from 28% to 15% and eliminating 
NTBs with the exception of security and health restrictions (IMF, 1998b).  In 
addition, in 1996, the state agricultural enterprises and cooperatives along with 
an extensive system of price controls were liberalized (IMF, 2000g). 
 
Madagascar  Open since 1996.  Agricultural exports were gradually liberalized over the 
period 1985 to 1992 (Paulson, 1999).  Under the privatization and liberalization 
program launched in 1996, most agricultural marketing boards have been 
liquidated and state monopolies have been virtually abolished (WTO, 2001f).  
Therefore, we conclude that this is sufficient progress to classify Madagascar as 
an open state without export monopoly trade barriers. 
 
Malawi  Remains closed based on its black market exchange rate premium.  Tariffs are 
Malawi’s primary trade policy instruments; its average tariff rate was 14% in 
2000/01.  State controls on marketing have been removed (WTO, 2002b). 
 
Malta  Open.  Insufficient historical data to assign date of opening.  Malta is dependent 
on foreign trade with Europe and is in the process of harmonizing its trade 
policies with those required by the EU.  Malta’s implicit import tariff rate 
(calculated as the ratio of total import duties to the total c.i.f. value of imports) is 
1%, down from an average of 9% in 1990-94 (IMF, 1999d). 
 
Mauritania  Open.  We cite 1997 as the opening date.  According to Sachs and Warner 
(1995, p. 86), Mauritania has been open since 1992, although it was included in 
the list of countries that remained closed in 1994 (p. 24).  We disagree with the 
1992 opening date based on IMF evidence of continued exchange rate and 
export monopoly trade barriers (IMF, 1999e).  
 
Between 1992 and 1995, Mauritania had a two-tiered exchange rate in order to 
limit the foreign exchange available for import purposes.  During this time, a 
parallel cash market existed which exceeded the official rate by “as much as 
20%” (IMF, 1999e).  In 1995, a unitary exchange system was restored.  We lack 
Easterly and Sewadeh (2002) data regarding the black market premium from 
1990-1996. 
 
Since 1997, nearly all export monopolies have been eliminated
1.  Finally, 
according to the IMF, the government significantly reduced its tariff regime in 
1997, although previous rates did not exceed the 40% criteria in Sachs Warner. 
 
Moldova  Open since 1994 (Sachs and Warner, 1995; European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 1994).  Moldova pursued aggressive trade liberalization 
during the mid-1990s.  Between 1996 and 1999, its weighted average tariff was 
4.3% and simple average tariff was 9.6% (IMF, 2001h).  However, agricultural 
                                                 
1 The fish exporting agency (SMCP), in which the state now only owns a 35% stake, is the exception.   45
reform has been a slower process.  As of 2001, 95% of state-owned and 
collective farms have been privatized; half of the farms were privatized in the 
period April 2000 through January 2001 (IMF, 2001h) 
 
Mozambique  Open since 1995.  Mozambique is no longer a Socialist state based on the 
Kornai (1992)  definition.   It adopted a new constitution in 1990 that allowed 
for a multi-party system.  During the late 1980s through early 1990s, 
government-established producer prices were gradually increased and then 
liberalized and the role of state trading companies was reduced (Paulson, 1999).  
Since 1995, the agricultural sector has been increasingly liberalized.  The state 
no longer has a monopoly on exports, despite its continued involvement in the 
cashew and sugar industries (WTO, 2001i). 
 
Mozambique’s simple average applied MFN tariff is 13.8% (WTO, 2001i).  Its 
unweighted tariff has ranged between 15% and 16% from 1987 until the present, 
in all years for which data is available (World Bank, 2000).   
 
Based on Sachs and Warner (1995) and available tariff and black market 
premium data, we conclude that agricultural protection was the primary factor in 
the Sachs Warner classification.  Therefore, we identify 1995 as the first year of 
openness. 
 
Myanmar  Remains closed based on its black market exchange rate premium. 
 
Niger  Open since 1994.  Through the 1994 reform program, the currency was devalued 
and public export monopolies were abolished (World Bank, 2000b).  Its BMP 
averaged only 2% between 1990-1999 and its tariff rate averaged 18% during 
the same period (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002; World Bank, 2000). SW 
classified Niger as closed as of the end of 1994, but we found that it liberalized 
in 1994 based on the reform of state marketing boards. 
 
Nigeria  Remains closed based on its black market exchange rate premium.  However, 
Nigeria has made substantial progress in liberalizing its trade regime and has 
abolished export marketing boards (WTO, 1998b). 
 
Pakistan  Open since 2001.  However Pakistan was closed based on the OPEN90-99 
criteria for the decade due to its tariff barriers, which averaged 55% between 
1990-1999 (World Bank, 2000).  In 1999, Pakistan launched the Economic 
Revival Program.  Pakistan has liberalized its export regime and significantly 
reduced its monopoly on exports (WTO, 2002c).  In 2001, Pakistan undertook a 
major restructuring of its customs tariff, thereby decreasing its average tariff to 
20.4% from 56% in 1993/94 (WTO, 2002c). 
 
Panama  Open since 1996.  According to the IMF (1999f), in the late 1980s, Panama had 
one of the most complex and distortionary trade regimes in the region.  
However, trade reform initiated in 1990 has transformed the economy into one 
of the most open economies.  Tariff reductions began in 1991, however non-
tariff barriers remained extensive until 1996 when, under an agreement to join 
the WTO, NTBs were significantly reduced.  Tariffs averaged 7.6% for the 
period 1995-2000 (UNCTAD, 2001). 
 
Papua New Guinea  Remains closed based on its COPRA export marketing board which has a 
monopoly both on domestic and export markets (WTO, 1999b).  Papua New 
Guinea was closed in Sachs and Warner (1995) based on its black market 
premium.  Its average premium for the period 1995-1999 was 18%, however in 
1998, the premium was 67% (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).  We only have   46
limited tariff and non-tariff barrier data.  In 1997, the average tariff rate was 
18.5%; non-tariff barriers covered 0.1% of trade (UNCTAD, 2001). 
 
Romania  Open since 1992  (Sachs and Warner, 1995; European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 1994).  By 1992, Romania had eliminated the state’s 
monopoly on trade (WTO, 1999c).  However, economic liberalization in 
Romania has not been as extensive as in other  Eastern European countries and 
state-enterprises continue to play a major role in the economy (WTO, 1999c).  
Its average unweighted tariff has ranged from 6% to 19.8% between 1995 and 
1999 (World Bank, 2000).  The country’s black market premium fell below 20% 
for the first time in 1997, although the decade-long average does not exceed 
20%. 
 
Russia  Closed based on black market premium, which averaged 50,980% between 1990 
and 1999 (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).  Russia has gradually transitioned 
toward a more market-based economic system, despite the economic crisis in 
1998.  Russia’s unweighted tariff rate averaged 11.24% between 1990 and 1999 
(World Bank, 2000).  The state has also exerted monopoly power through state-
owned enterprises, such as Gazprom in the energy sector.   
 
Rwanda  Remains closed based on its black market exchange rate premium. 
 
Senegal  Remains closed.  Senegal continues to maintain an export monopoly in the 
cotton industry (World Bank, 1999). 
 
Sierra Leone  Open since 2001.  Due to the civil war in Sierra Leone, economic and trade 
liberalization was severely limited during the 1990s.  However, in recent years, 
economic liberalization has progressed.  The spread between the official and 
parallel market exchange rates decreased from 35% in February 2000 to 5% in 
December 2000.  In 2001, the maximum tariff was reduced from 40% to 30%.  
Finally, the state export marketing board was abolished (IMF, 2001i). 
 
Slovak Republic  Open since 1991  (Sachs and Warner, 1995; European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 1994).  The Slovak Republic relied on a relatively free trade 
regime in its transition toward a market-based economy.  The simple average 
MFN tariff was 6.1% in 2001, down from 8% in 1995 (WTO, 2001j).  Based on 
World Bank data, the 1990-1999 average unweighted tariff was 7.35% (World 
Bank, 2000).  However, the country maintains protection for the agricultural 
sector. 
 
Slovenia  Open since 1991  (Sachs and Warner, 1995; European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 1994).  Slovenia has a relatively free trade regime.  Although 
tariff and NTB data is limited, Slovenia’s average unweighted tariff was 10.6% 
in 1996 and 2000 (World Bank, 2000).  Based on IMF data (1998c), 98% of 
imports were free of quantitative restrictions, the primary NTB, by 1996. 
 
Somalia  Closed on the basis of its black market premium, which averaged 247% between 
1990-1999 (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002).  While Somalia was classified as a 
Socialist state in 1987 by Kornai (1992), it has been a country effectively 
without a national government since 1991 (Paulson, 1999).   
 
Swaziland  Open.  Insufficient historical data to assign date of opening.  Swaziland’s 
average unweighted tariff weight was 15.1% in 1997 (World Bank, 2000).  Its 
NTBs and black market premium satisfy the Sachs and Warner (1995) criteria 
for openness.  While Swaziland’s black market premium has remained less than   47
20% since 1986, we lack sufficient data for the other variables to assign an 
opening date.   
 
Syrian Arab Republic  Remains closed based on its black market exchange rate premium. 
 
Tajikistan  Open since 1996.  According the IMF, exchange rate and trade liberalization 
were virtually completed by 1996 (IMF, 1998d).  By 2000, Tajikistan’s average 
tariff rate was less than 10% and it had no major NTBs (IMF, 2000h).  In 
addition, in 1996, the former state cotton enterprise, Glavkhlopkoprom’s 
monopoly on cotton exports was abolished (IMF, 1998d).  We lack data on its 
black market premium.     
 
Tanzania  Open since 1995.  Tanzania had been a highly socialist state (despite the fact 
that it was not labeled as such in Kornai (1992) and therefore in the original 
Sachs and Warner, 1995.)  Tanzania began a democratic transition in the early 
1990s and opposition parties were officially registered in 1992 (Devarajan et al, 
2001).  The first multiparty election occurred in 1995.  Since 1995, trade 
liberalization has accelerated and the government has withdrawn from any direct 
agricultural marketing activities (WTO, 2001k). 
 
Trinidad and Tobago  Open since 1992.  Sachs and Warner (1995) classified Trinidad and Tobago as 
closed as of 1994 based on their black market premium indicator and discussion 
in Trends in Developing Economies, 1994 (TIDE).  However, Trinidad and 
Tobago initiated an economic and trade liberalization program in the mid-1980s 
that has led to the elimination of major trade barriers (WTO, 1998e).  Its average 
unweighted tariff decreased from 17.3% in 1988 to 9.2% in 1998 (World Bank, 
2000).  We cite 1992 as the date of opening due to the fact that the black market 
premium decreased from 33% in 1991 to 17% in 1992, thereby satisfying the 
Sachs and Warner criteria (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002). SW classified the 
Dominican Republic as closed as of 1994. The country continuously satisfied all 
criteria for the first time in 1992. 
 
Turkmenistan  Turkmenistan remains closed based on its black market premium which was 
43% in 1999 after the country’s dual exchange rate system was replaced by a 
unitary system in 1998 (Easterly and Sewadeh, 2002; IMF, 1999g).  The state 
continues to have an export monopoly over cotton, the country’s primary export 
crop.  Turkmenpahta is essentially an agricultural marketing board (IMF, 
1999g).  We lack data on tariff and non-tariff barriers for Turkmenistan. 
 
Togo  Remains closed.  Togo still maintains an export monopoly over cotton, its 
primary cash crop.  However, under the 1994-1997 Structural Adjustment 
Program, Togo liberalized portions of its agriculture industry and abolished its 
coffee and cocoa marketing boards (WTO, 1999d).  Its average tariff rate was 
15% between 1990-1999 (World Bank, 2000). 
 
Ukraine  Remains closed.  Ukraine’s tariff barriers are relatively low, averaging 9.7% 
(unweighted) between 1990 and 1999 (World Bank, 2000).  However, its NTBs 
complicate the trade regime and limit overall liberalization.  Ukraine continues 
to maintain numerous state monopolies in the agriculture sector, which include 
export monopolies.  The National Bank of Ukraine imposed exchange 
restrictions in August 1998 (IMF, 1999h). 
 
Uzbekistan  Remains closed.  Uzbekistan has a dual exchange rate system and the spread 
between the official and parallel market rates was 40% in 1999 (IMF, 2000i).  
Uzbekistan’s average tariff rate increased from 14% in 1995 to 26% in 1999 
(IMF, 2000i).   48
 
Venezuela  Open since 1996.  In 1989, Venezuela’s  import substitution policies were 
replaced by a more open trade regime, the country implemented a flexible 
exchange rate and reduced trade barriers prior to becoming a member of  GATT 
in 1990 (WTO, 1996).  However, foreign exchange restrictions were imposed in 
1993, leading Sachs and Warner (1995) to classify the country as closed. 
 
While such exchange restrictions constituted trade barriers, Venezuela did not 
slip in terms of other trade liberalization efforts.  Therefore, we cite 1996, the 
year in which the exchange controls were abolished, according to the IMF 
(1998d), as the year of opening. 
 
Yugoslavia, (FR)  We conclude that FR Yugoslavia (referring to Montenegro and Serbia) opened 
in 2001.  However, it was closed on the basis of the OPEN90-99 black market 
premium criterion, as its BMP averaged 106% between 1990-1999
2. 
 
Sachs and Warner classified the Federal Republic (FR) of Yugoslavia as closed 
in 1994 because it had been a Socialist state.  Despite liberalization episodes 
between 1965-74 and 1983-85, Yugoslavia remained Socialist until the 
Communist party’s undivided rule collapsed in 1990.  The 1990s were marked 
by ethnic conflict and trade sanctions imposed by the United Nations. 
  
  FR Yugoslavia carried out significant liberalization in 2001, including nearly 
eliminating quantitative restrictions and licensing requirements (World Bank, 
2001).  
 
Zimbabwe  Zimbabwe remains closed based on the black market exchange rate premium.  
In addition, the unweighted tariff, including surcharges, has been only slightly 
reduced from  39% to 36% through a new tariff structure that came into effect in 
September 2000.  There are also a number of NTBs  (IMF, 2002b). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Note, however, that this decade average is only based on 1990 data.  No subsequent BMP data is 
available.   49
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APPENDIX 4 - Trade Liberalization and Concurrent Events in a Sample of 13 Countries 
 
Country  Year of 
liberalization 
Sample 
period  Policy Changes and Political Events 
Countries with Negative or Zero Post-Liberalization Growth Changes 
Hungary 1990  1971-
1998 
Hungary experienced a period of declining growth and generally poor economic conditions between 1971, the 
beginning of our data, and 1991, after liberalization occurred. 1988 and 1989 were years of political change: the 
majority party leader changed after 30 years and a period of political uncertainty ensued (EIU). The new government 
implemented a stabilization program in 1989, which included higher taxes, tighter monetary policy, and the 
devaluation of the currency (World Bank, 1995) 
In 1990/1991, an IMF restructuring program was implemented. Structural reforms, including currency devaluation, a 
new exchange-rate mechanism, a tight wage policy in the public sector, and fiscal measures to enhance revenues and 
cut expenditures, were implemented in 1995. Hungary accelerated privatization efforts, restructuring enterprises 
(including major commercial banks) and implementing financial sector and public finance reforms, in the mid-1990s. 
There have also been significant improvements in the legal and regulatory framework of the financial sector 
(Wacziarg and Wallack, 2003). 
1992/1993 marked the beginning of an economic recovery. During the mid 1990s, Hungary adhered to the IMF plan 
and experienced gradual stabilization and recovery. However, Hungary’s growth did not return to the levels seen prior 
to liberalization. Persisting high levels of debt and current account deficits may have limited Hungary’s gains from 
trade liberalization. In addition, in 1993, the government tightened monetary policy and increased the interest rate, 
which likely dampened the economic recovery (World Bank, 1995). Finally, while structural reforms were 
implemented in 1995, the full effects may not have been evident before the end of our data in 1998.  
Mexico 1986  1951-
1998 
Prior to liberalization, the 1940s-1960s was a period of political and social stability and relatively high economic 
growth (Tornell). However, in the early 1970s, expansionary fiscal and monetary policy led to increasing levels of 
debt, escalating prices, and an overvaluation of the exchange rate. By 1976, inflation was increasing and private 
investment decreasing. In August 1976, the government was forced to devalue the peso and decrease government 
expenditure (Gonzalez, 1994). 
Oil, discovered in 1977, stimulated the economy between 1978 and 1982 and in 1981 accounted for ¾ of Mexico’s 
exports. However, financed by international borrowing, government spending increased and again resulted in the 
overvaluation of the peso. By mid-1981, the international price of oil had fallen and by 1982, Mexico declared itself 
unable to service its debt. The government devalued the peso by 30% in February 1982 and implemented a two-tiered 
foreign exchange system in August, 1982. Mexico experienced a severe recession during the Latin American debt 
crisis between 1982-83 (Gonzalez, 1994). 
In 1984, Mexico pursued a policy of privatization and liberalization in order to attract FDI (Henry, 1999). In 1985, it 
implemented a program of stabilization and structural adjustment, including trade liberalization. It joined GATT in 
1986 and significantly reduced import restrictions and tariff barriers. A debt rescheduling agreement was signed in 
August 1985. In July 1986, an IMF agreement was implemented, facilitating additional debt restructuring. Further   55
Country  Year of 
liberalization 
Sample 
period  Policy Changes and Political Events 
trade liberalization measures were implemented in August, 1987. (Henry, 1999). Mexico also pursued a privatization 
program during the 1980s, which continued into the 1990s, with the privatization of the banking industry (Wacziarg 
and Wallack, 2003, and Henry, 1999). 
An economic and fiscal crisis occurred again in 1994-1995. This was accompanied by a period of political unrest, 
including the Chiapas uprising and the assassination of several PRI figures (Henry, 1999). In December 1994, Mexico 
devalued the peso and implemented a floating exchange rate regime. In 1995, the country received a bailout, which 
prevented it from defaulting on its debt and allowed further access to international capital markets (Tornell, 2002). 
Despite the economic recovery and trade liberalization that occurred during the late 1980s, Mexico never recovered to 
its pre-crisis levels of growth. The persisting macroeconomic instability and lack of further structural reforms appear 
to have been key factors in limiting the gains from trade liberalization by preventing economic restructuring and 
reallocation of resources. According to the IMF (1999), further banking sector reforms and continued economic 
restructuring were still necessary in order to sustain economic growth. The macroeconomic environment was hindered 
by the volatile price of oil, uncertainty regarding debt negotiations, and speculative attacks on the currency. As the 
government decreased expenditure under the structural adjustment program, domestic demand fell. During the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the currency became overvalued again, thereby effectively offsetting trade liberalization 
measures. Non-trade barriers to competition also existed in the form of government monopolies and oligopolies that 
limited restructuring. Furthermore, the high interest rate aimed at preventing speculative attacks and attracting foreign 
capital, limited domestic demand and restructuring (Gonzalez). 
The Mexican economy improved between 1995-1998 (the end of our data) due to the implementation of structural 
reforms and the success of the floating exchange rate in mitigating the effect of external shocks (IMF, 1999). 
Botswana 1979 1961-
1998 
Botswana is generally cited as an African success story. Since gaining independence in 1966, Botswana has had one of 
the fastest growth rates in the world (IMF, 2002). Botswana’s income per capita (In PPP-adjusted terms in 1998) was 
4 times the African average and the country grew at an annual rate of 7.7% between 1965 and 1998. (Rodrik, 2003). 
However, based on our data, Botswana experienced a mean growth difference of -1.99% (pre/post liberalization). This 
difference appears to be primarily due to the fact that Botswana experienced very high levels of growth prior to 
liberalization and greater dependence on volatile world diamond prices post liberalization. Another potential 
explanation may lie in the limitations of structural reform implemented in Botswana. Rodrik (2003) notes that despite 
trade liberalization and an export-oriented economy, government intervention has been high in Botswana and that the 
public sector accounts for a large share of the economy. 
Botswana’s economy expanded when diamond mining began in 1971. The recession of 1981/1982 was partly due to a 
weak world diamond market. The late 1980s were a period of new mining activity and strong demand that supported 
overall economic growth. However, during the early to mid 1990s, recessionary conditions on the world diamond 
market led to a severe economic slump. Given that diamond exports account of (70%) of export earnings and more 
than one-third of GDP, volatile diamond prices have had a significant impact on the country’s overall economic 
growth. However, despite the volatility, growth remained positive nearly the entire period. (IMF, 2002, EIU).   56
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Israel 1985  1951-
1998 
In Israel, the wars of 1967 and 1973 limited economic growth. In 1977, both tariff and currency barriers were relaxed 
and in 1979, the government approved a five-year plan to reduce inflation and customs rates. In January, 1980, tariffs 
were further reduced on imports coming from the EEC. Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982 and roughly a year later, 
Israel entered a deep economic crisis, with 3-digit inflation, an increasing trade gap, a rapidly mounting foreign debt, 
and significant real exchange rate appreciation. 
In July 1985, the government implemented an emergency economic stabilization plan in order to stop hyperinflation 
and signed a free trade agreement with the United States (Henry, 1999). Inflation dropped significantly in late 1985-
1986 and the IMF announced its support for Israeli reform efforts. In 1986, Israel fixed the exchange rate to a trade-
weighted currency basket. It devalued the currency 19%, along with other changes affecting the tax system and money 
markets in January 1987. 
Despite devaluations of the currency in 1988 and 1989, the interest rate increased because of the currency volatility. In 
1991, Israel implemented a crawling band exchange rate system; the Shekel was devalued by 6% in order to boost the 
economy that was suffering due to the Gulf War. In November 1995, a Free Trade area Treaty affirming Israel’s 
special trade status with the EU was signed (Henry, 1999). 
Despite Israel’s trade reforms implemented throughout the period, Israel’s heterodox stabilization program may have 
offset the effects of trade liberalization. Social pacts based on broad coalitions of labor, government, and industry, set 
the patterns for prices, wages, and the exchange rate (Wacziarg and Wallack). In addition, inflation, currency 
volatility, and high interest rates in the late 1980s and early 1990s reduced Israel’s competitiveness and the gains from 
trade. 
Philippines 1988  1951-
1998 
During the 1960s, the Marcos regime increased trade barriers that remained in effect until the 1980s. During an 
economic crisis in the early 1980s, the inflation rate increased significantly (1983 -1986); the currency was devalued by 
50% in 1984; and expansionary monetary policy limited capital inflow and economic growth. The Philippines secured 
debt rescheduling agreements between 1985 and 1988 and the IMF approved a stabilization plan in 1989. 
In 1986 (the end of the Marcos era), the Philippines implemented trade liberalization measures, including lifting 
import restrictions. However, while the Philippines implemented trade reforms, government investment in state-owned 
enterprises roughly doubled during the sample time period, as did SOEs’ percentage of total economic activity, 
employment, and net financial flows (Wacziarg and Wallack, 2003).  
The Philippines implemented capital market liberalization, including on the foreign exchange rate, in 1992. The IMF 
approved the country’s economic performance and rescheduled additional debt. Further trade reforms, including 
removing quantitative restrictions, were also implemented during the early 1990s. (Henry, 1999). 
Despite further trade liberalization measures, the Philippines has not witnessed the increased economic growth 
experienced in other countries following liberalization. It appears that the limited structural reforms and persisting 
high level of government involvement in SOEs may be a limiting factor. In addition, Pritchett (2003) cites the 
institutional uncertainty that arose from the political instability in the Philippines following liberalization as a factor 
that may have limited investment and economic growth.   57
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Colombia 1986 1951-
1998 
In December 1990, Colombia was unable to repay its debt principal payments and was unable to refinance its debt 
until April 1991. In the wake of this crisis, Colombia pursued a variety of market-oriented reforms in addition to 
further trade liberalization. Price controls were lifted, a financial sector reform was implemented, the exchange control 
system was liberalized, the regulatory framework was modernized, certain industries were privatized (Wacziarg and 
Wallack, 2003). 
Throughout the 1990s, further substantial trade reforms were implemented, including bilateral trading agreements with 
Latin American countries in 1993/1994 (Henry, 1999). However, 1992 marked a rise in civil unrest and political 
instability persisted throughout the 1990s. This factor likely limited Colombia’s post-liberalization economic growth. 
Countries with Positive Post-Liberalization Growth Changes 
Poland 1990  1971-
1998 
Poland’s economy collapsed during the 1970s. In August 1980, the Solidarity movement began and a period of 
political unrest ensued. Martial law remained in effect through December 1982 before economic recovery began. In 
1986, Poland was accepted into the IMF and began to pursue debt restructuring. However, in 1989, hyperinflation 
impeded economic growth and Poland’s debt was still 74% of GDP (de Menil, 2003). 
In 1990, the government implemented a swift and comprehensive set of market reforms, including trade liberalization, 
in order to stabilize the economy. The reforms of this “Balcerowicz Plan” included removal of price controls, 
reduction of government expenditure and investment, devaluation of the exchange rate, and removal of subsidies for 
energy (Wacziarg and Wallack, 2003). Trade liberalization measures included the liberalization and elimination of 
exchange controls, abolishing state trading monopolies and nearly all quotas and tariffs. In addition, currency was 
devalued by over 50% in January 1990 and then gradually depreciated based on a crawling peg until 1995 (de Menil, 
2003). 
1991 marked a deep recession; however Poland persisted in its liberalization program. Poland implemented a new IMF 
plan that included tax reform and continued privatization in 1993. During the mid-1990s, Poland continued to 
implement reforms, including currency reform, privatizations, and policies to promote FDI. Poland applied for EU 
membership in 1994 and became an OECD member in 1996 (EIU). 
According to de Menil (2003), productivity gains appear to have been the primary factors in Poland’s growth during 
the 1990s. He cites that the comprehensive structural reforms facilitated an economic transformation, reallocation of 
resources, and rapid adoption of “Western principles of management and standards of efficiency.” 
Ghana 1985  1956-
1998 
Upon gaining independence in 1957, Ghana pursued a strategy of import substitution and implemented a series of 
restrictive trade policies, including increasing tariffs, NTBs, and exchange rate controls, along with establishing state-
owned enterprises (SOEs). By 1966, the currency was overvalued and a cycle of political instability (including 
military coups) and increasing inflation followed by currency devaluations ensured during the late 1960s and 1970s 
(Leith and Lofchie, 1993). 
Another economic crisis occurred in 1982 in which inflation increased and foreign exchange reserves dropped to very 
low levels. In 1983, the government launched a 4-year economic recovery program that included restructuring the   58
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physical infrastructure and economic institutions, and decreasing inflation through prudent monetary, fiscal, and trade 
policies. The 1985 trade liberalization program was part of the Rawlings administration’s World Bank and IMF-
supported Economic Recovery Program. Multiple exchange rates were initially implemented to promote exports, then 
unified and subjected to a series of devaluations. Public sector employment (including in state-owned enterprises) was 
cut and distortions in wages reduced (Wacziarg and Wallack, 2003). Ghana continued to implement trade and capital 
market reforms through the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Uganda 1988  1951-
1998 
The period from when Uganda gained its independence in 1962 through 1980 was a period of economic devastation 
due to mismanagement and war in which capital was destroyed and manufacturing operated at extremely low capacity. 
Uganda implemented an IMF reform program in 1981. This program included measures such as floating the currency, 
removing price controls and fiscal austerity. The reform program was initially successful, but the success was not 
sustained and the IMF withdrew its support in 1984, a year which marked the beginning of a period of economic 
collapse and civil war (EIU). 
In 1985, policies to promote FDI and liberalize the foreign exchange market were implemented. A new economic 
recovery program launched in 1987. However, political unrest occurred in 1987, which led to a tightening of the 
capital market. In 1988, further trade and capital market liberalization measures resumed and were followed by 
banking reforms and overall privatization between 1989 and 1992. In 1993/1994, further trade and capital market 
liberalization measures were implemented, including the liberalization of the interest rate (EIU). A variety of different 
currency regimes were implemented between 1988 and 1992 and, at different times, the currency was pegged to the 
US dollar and a composite of other currencies before a flexible exchange rate system was implemented in 1996 
(Amvouna, 1998). 
Taiwan 1963  1952-
1998 
While the majority of countries in this sub-sample implemented trade liberalization in the wake of economic and often 
political crises as well, Taiwan had a stable economic environment and relatively low tariff rates at the time of 
liberalization. Trade liberalization in the early 1960s involved further tariff reductions along with incentives to attract 
FDI, including establishing EPZs. (Sakuarai, 1995). 
Between 1985 and 1987, trade liberalization involved further reductions in tariffs and NTBs. In 1985, Taiwan 
implemented polices to promote FDI and liberalize the foreign exchange market. In 1987, capital controls were 
tightened. However, Taiwan implemented capital market reform measures along with additional trade reform 
measures in 1988. Taiwan implemented banking reforms and overall privatization measures through 1989-1992 
(Henry, 1999). 
Chile 1976  1952-
1998 
When Allende assumed power in 1970, he nationalized copper mines, banks and other industries. Government 
expenditure increased dramatically; the country’s budget deficit rose from 2.7% of GDP to 25% between 1970 and 
1973. The currency black market premium exceeded 600% in 1972 and inflation exceeded 100% in 1973 (Easterly 
and Sewadeh, 2000, Stallings and Brock, 1993).  
In 1973, Pinochet overthrew Allende in a military coup that marked a significant change in policy. Between 1975 and 
1982, structural changes to liberalize the financial system were implemented. Quantitative restrictions were eliminated   59
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in 1973; tariffs were significantly reduced between 1973 and 1979 when they were set at a uniform rate of 10%. In 
1979, the exchange rate was fixed to the US$, capital controls reduced, the tax system simplified and privatization 
pursued (Stallings and Brock, 1993). 
Trade reform in the early years of the pro-market Pinochet administration was accompanied by privatization, 
elimination of the fiscal deficit, and lifting of price and interest rate controls. Liberalization of the labor market also 
facilitated overall economic restructuring (Wacziarg and Wallack, 2003). 
In 1980/81, Chile privatized its social security system and implemented banking reforms. However, Chile experienced 
an economic crisis during the Latin American debt crisis. Chile was unable to access credit markets and the 
government intervened and assumed control of troubled banks. In 1982, GDP fell 14% and inflation doubled. Between 
1982 and 1985, the peso was devalued, tariff rates increased to 35%, and the country reversed privatization (Stallings 
and Brock, 1993). In 1985, the peso was gradually depreciated with a crawling peg, tariffs were lowered to 15%, and 
privatization resumed. During the mid to late 1980s, Chile decreased tariffs, rescheduled its debt, and re-privatized the 
banking sector. During the 1990s, Chile implemented free trade agreements with Mexico and Colombia and 
implemented substantial capital market liberalization (Henry, 1999). 
Korea 1968  1954-
1998 
Political turmoil in South Korea in the late 1950s forced President Rhee’s resignation in 1960. This was followed by a 
military coup in 1961 and continued political unrest; inflation increased and foreign exchange reserves decreased 
significantly before Korea stabilized and started its slow transition to democratic rule in 1964 (Haggard, Cooper, and 
Moon, 1993). 
Korea transitioned from a policy of import substitution to export-oriented growth during the mid-1960s. Tariffs and 
NTBs were reduced and the government created export processing zones (EPZs) and other means of increasing FDI 
(Sakuarai, 1995). The currency was devalued, the tax system and interest rates reformed, and capital markets 
liberalized. In 1965, the export development committee was established and in 1966, quantitative restrictions were 
eliminated. However, liberalization was not universal; certain sectors remained protected, and government 
involvement in the economy remained pervasive. 
President Park was assassinated in November 1979, which was followed by a year of political/economic crisis. In 
1980, significant banking reforms were announced and in 1981, a 5-yr economic plan of structural adjustment was 
initiated. While economic growth was dampened during the financial crisis in 1982-84, capital and banking sector 
reforms were implemented in 1984. Further trade reforms were implemented in the mid-late 1980s, including tariff 
and NTB reductions. Banking and capital market reforms were deepened in 1991 in an effort to attract FDI and in 
1993, a five-year plan for reform and further financial system regulation was implemented (Henry, 1999). 
Indonesia 1970 1961-
1998 
During the early 1960s, Indonesia suffered an economic crisis, with high budget deficits and inflation up to 640%. In 
March, 1966, under pressure from the army President Sukarno transferred some power to Soeharto; in March 1967 
Soeharto was named President. A 5 -year development plan to stabilize the economy and promote growth was 
implemented which successfully stabilized the economy. 
Capital market liberalization occurred in 1970. In February 1976, the government reduced the 10% export duty on a   60
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wide range of commodities. However, during the 1970s, government intervention increased despite trade liberalization 
reforms being implemented. The government increased its control of state-owned banks and other SOEs. Oil revenue 
was significant during the 1970s, however, economic growth weakened in the early 1980s due in part to falling oil 
prices. However, the impact was mitigated by the country’s “swift adjustment and a debt burden that was lower than 
elsewhere.” (Temple, 2004). 
In June 1983, the Government announced a series of bank liberalization reforms, followed by further reforms in 1988 
when credit subsidies were removed (Temple, 2003). Devaluations occurred in 1983 and 1986. During 1984/1985, 
Indonesia entered into bilateral trading agreements with the Soviet Union, the U.S., and several other countries. In 
May 1986, the government announced new measures to attract foreign investment. The oil market crashed in the 
second quarter of 1986. During 1986, further trade and investment liberalization measures were implemented; QRs 
and NTBs were gradually removed. The government implemented a wide-scale privatization program during the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Between 1991 and 1995, the government implemented banking reforms to strengthen the 
system, but later weakened regulations to stimulate lending. During 1991 to 1995, capital market reforms aimed at 
improving stock exchange were implemented (Henry, 1999, EIU). 
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Table 1 – Countries that were classified as closed in 1970-1989 period, and as open in the 
1990-99 period 
 
Argentina Ecuador  Kenya  Peru 
Benin Egypt,  Arab  Rep.*  Madagascar*  Philippines 
Bolivia El  Salvador  Mali  Poland 
Botswana  The Gambia  Mauritania  South Africa 
Brazil Ghana Mexico  Sri  Lanka 
Burkina Faso*  Guatemala  Morocco  Trinidad and Tobago* 
Cameroon Guinea  Mozambique*  Tunisia 
Chile Guinea-Bissau  New  Zealand  Turkey 
Colombia Honduras Nicaragua Uganda 
Costa Rica  Hungary  Niger*  Uruguay 
Côte d'Ivoire*  Israel  Paraguay  Venezuela* 
Dominican Republic*  Jamaica     
(* denotes countries that were still classified as closed by SW as late as 1994) 
 
 
Table 2 – Countries not classified in SW, and their 1990-1999 status 
 
Open in 1990-1999  Closed in 1990-1999 
Albania Lesotho Belarus 
Armenia Lituania Croatia 
Azerbaijan Macedonia,  FYR  Estonia 
Bulgaria Malta  Kazakhstan 
Cape Verde  Moldova  Liberia 
Czech Republic  Panama  Romania 
Georgia  Slovak Republic  Russian Federation 
Iceland Slovenia  Turkmenistan 
Kyrgyz Republic  Swaziland  Ukraine 
Latvia Tajikistan  Uzbekistan 
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Table 3 – Dates of Liberalization of Countries that Liberalized since 1994 or were not 
included in the SW list of liberalization dates 
 
 
Date of 
Liberalization 
Cape Verde  1991*
Dominican Republic  1992**
Trinidad and Tobago  1992**
Côte d'Ivoire  1994**
Niger 1994**
Mauritania 1995**
Egypt, Arab Rep.  1995
Mozambique 1995
Tanzania 1995
Armenia 1995
Azerbaijan 1995
Bangladesh 1996
Ethiopia 1996
Madagascar 1996
Venezuela 1996
Georgia 1996
Panama 1996*
Tajikistan 1996
Burkina Faso  1998
Burundi 1999
Pakistan 2001
Sierra Leone  2001
Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/Montenegro)  2001
(* Not classified in SW; ** Disagreement with SW – see text for explanations) 
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Table 4 - Countries that Remained Closed as of 2001 
 
Algeria  Iceland *  Russian Federation 
Angola India**  Rwanda 
Belarus** Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  Senegal 
Central African Republic  Iraq  Somalia 
Chad Kazakhstan  Swaziland* 
China  Lesotho*  Syrian Arab Republic 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  Liberia*  Togo 
Congo, Rep.  Malawi  Turkmenistan 
Croatia** Malta*  Ukraine 
Estonia** Myanmar  Uzbekistan 
Gabon Nigeria  Zimbabwe 
Haiti  Papua New Guinea   
(* Not classified in SW; ** Disagreement with SW – see text for explanations) 
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Table 5 – Replication of the SW 1970-1989 regressions using Penn World Tables 6.0 Data 
(Table 11 in SW 1995) 
 
 
Dep. Var: Growth 
1970-1998 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
LRGDPCH70  0.5038 -1.4491 0.0123 -1.5681 -1.5960 -1.6262 -1.5929
    (2.23) (5.59) (0.04) (4.46) (4.93) (5.09) (4.89)
LIBER_SW_1970-89        2.2277  2.0226 1.9845
          (4.49)  (4.03) (3.87)
POL         -0.7500 -0.6974
           (1.82) (1.66)
SEC70      3.2580 0.8967  0.6794 0.8059
        (2.84) (0.76)  (0.58) (0.68)
PRI70      0.9546 1.6132  1.4877 1.4003
        (1.07) (1.92)  (1.79) (1.65)
GVXDXE7084      -0.0969 -0.0836  -0.0841 -0.0844
        (3.32) (3.05)  (3.11) (3.02)
REVCOUP7085      -0.8773 -1.0239  -0.4467 -0.4359
        (1.19) (1.51)  (0.60) (0.58)
ASSASS7085      -0.1050 -0.0066  0.0249 0.0296
        (0.42) (0.03)  (0.11) (0.13)
PPI70DEV     -0.1585 -0.2552  -0.1983 -0.1709
        (0.46) (0.80)  (0.63) (0.53)
INV7089          0.1098 0.0733  0.0823 0.0757
        (3.92) (2.72)  (3.04) (2.64)
DENSI60             0.0006
             ( 0 . 9 0 )
Intercept  -2.6772 16.2669 0.4560 11.7471 11.9772 12.4662 12.2482
    (1.46) (7.00) (0.20) (4.34) (4.80) (5.03) (4.87)
 Adj. R
2  0.034 0.502 -0.014 0.438 0.540 0.552 0.546
 # of Obs.  115  31 74 96 93  93 91
(Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) 
Column 2: Sample of open economies according to the SW dummy for 1970-89 
Column 3: Sample of closed economies according to the SW dummy for 1970-89 
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Table 6 – Replication of the SW cross-sectional regressions using the updated openness 
dummy for the 1990-1999 decade 
 
Dep. Var: Growth 
1990-1998 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
LRGDPCH89 0.564  0.646 -1.452 -1.266 -1.141  -1.112 -1.150
 (2.33)  (3.38) (1.38) (2.35) (2.07)  (1.88) (1.95)
LIBER_WW_1990-99    0.050 0.025 0.136
    (0.08) (0.04) (0.21)
POL     0.180 0.165
     (0.30) (0.28)
SEC85   4.437 4.165  4.328 4.689
   (2.46) (2.34)  (2.25) (2.43)
PRI85   1.153 1.350  1.271 1.381
   (0.75) (0.89)  (0.78) (0.86)
CG8998   -0.089 -0.081  -0.081 -0.063
   (2.04) (1.85)  (1.74) (1.32)
REVOL8998   -1.078 -0.834  -0.836 -0.986
   (1.21) (0.95)  (0.92) (1.08)
ASSASS8998   0.503 0.444  0.452 0.483
   (1.64) (1.47)  (1.46) (1.56)
PPI89DEV   -0.746 -0.723  -0.695 -0.734
   (1.28) (1.26)  (1.17) (1.24)
INV8998   0.091 0.078  0.078 0.051
   (2.00) (1.75)  (1.66) (1.01)
DENSI80     0.0009
     (1.40)
Intercept -3.53  -3.978 11.030 9.207 8.139  7.835 7.752
 (1.73)  (2.39) (1.39) (2.40) (2.13)  (1.82) (1.81)
R
2 0.037  0.119 0.034 0.248 0.217  0.201 0.211
# of obs.  116  78 27 94 93  89 89
(Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) 
Column 2: Sample of open economies according to the openness dummy for 1990-99 
Column 3: Sample of closed economies according to the openness dummy for 1990-99 
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Table 7 - Replication of the SW cross-sectional regressions for each decade using the date-
based openness indicator for 1970, 1980 and 1989. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
Variable:  Growth 1970-80  Growth 1980-89  Growth 1989-98 
LRGDPCH(t) -1.395  -1.292 -1.231 -1.397 -1.221  -1.261
 (3.09)  (2.83) (3.39) (3.84) (2.21)  (2.13)
LIBER_(t)  1.206 1.387 2.643 2.574 0.338  0.521
 (1.82)  (1.86) (4.47) (4.17) (0.59)  (0.84)
SEC(t) 1.020  0.169 1.261 1.822 4.243  4.872
 (0.60)  (0.10) (0.98) (1.40) (2.39)  (2.52)
PRI(t) 3.333  2.455 0.413 -0.139 1.510  1.616
 (2.85)  (2.01) (0.33) (0.11) (0.98)  (0.99)
CG(t, t+10)  -0.016  -0.005 -0.070 -0.065 -0.077  -0.059
 (0.61)  (0.19) (2.65) (2.51) (1.76)  (1.26)
REVOL(t, t+10)  -1.914  -1.238 -0.739 -0.211 -0.851  -1.030
 (1.87)  (1.12) (0.79) (0.21) (0.97)  (1.13)
ASSASS(t, t+10)  0.153  0.276 0.182 0.188 0.433  0.473
 (0.52)  (0.94) (0.52) (0.54) (1.43)  (1.54)
PPIDEV(t) -0.498  -0.476 0.366 0.350 -0.708  -0.721
 (1.04)  (0.99) (0.89) (0.87) (1.24)  (1.23)
INV(t, t+10)  0.075  0.076 0.113 0.103 0.072  0.040
   (2.13)  (2.02) (2.77) (2.30) (1.59)  (0.76)
POL   -0.907 -0.780   0.224
   (1.47) (1.51)   (0.38)
DENSI(t-10)   0.001 0.001   0.001
   (0.60) (0.87)   (1.49)
Intercept 9.441  9.334 8.865 10.635 8.511  8.288
 (2.94)  (2.84) (3.30) (3.86) (2.21)  (1.92)
R
2  0.33 0.35 0.49 0.53 0.30  0.32
# of Obs.  106  99 101 97 93  89
(Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses) 
(t) denotes the beginning date of each period – 1970-1980, 1980-89, 1989-98. 
(t, t+10) denotes the average computed between dates t and t+10.    
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Table 8 - Seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) Estimates using three periods  
(1970-1980, 1980-1989, 1989-1998) 
 
 
 
(1) 
SUR 
(2) 
SUR 
(3) 
SUR 
(4) 
SUR 
(5) 
SUR -
Iterated 
(6) 
SUR -
Period 
Dummies
LRGDPCH(t) -0.155 -1.518 -1.612 -1.600 -1.616  -1.687
 (0.84) (5.07) (5.36) (5.34) (5.40)  (5.70)
LIBER_SW_(t)  1.988 1.247 1.214 1.363 1.407 1.330
 (5.61) (3.54) (3.33) (3.61) (3.73)  (3.52)
POL     -0.721 -0.833 -0.872  -0.708
     (1.96) (2.20) (2.28)  (1.89)
SEC(t)   2.418 2.398 2.312 2.271  3.237
   (2.36) (2.34) (2.21) (2.16)  (3.05)
PRI(t)   1.497 1.203 1.130 1.055  1.748
   (1.77) (1.42) (1.34) (1.25)  (2.10)
CG(t, t+10)    -0.066 -0.054 -0.044 -0.044  -0.038
   (3.28) (2.71) (2.19) (2.21)  (1.92)
REVOL(t, t+10)    -1.317 -1.015 -1.011 -1.004  -1.043
   (2.40) (1.80) (1.78) (1.77)  (1.89)
ASSASS(t, t+10)    0.237 0.236 0.275 0.268  0.242
   (1.28) (1.30) (1.51) (1.47)  (1.36)
PPIDEV(t)   0.213 0.148 0.148 0.168  0.088
   (0.72) (0.51) (0.51) (0.58)  (0.31)
INV(t, t+10)    0.106 0.109 0.094 0.095  0.066
   (4.48) (4.63) (3.76) (3.82)  (2.53)
DENSI(t-10)      0.001 0.001  0.001
      (1.57) (1.53)  (2.13)
Intercept7080        12.828
        ( 6 . 0 1 )
Intercept8089        11.253
        ( 5 . 2 8 )
Intercept8998        11.802
        ( 5 . 5 8 )
Intercept 1.901 10.979 11.944 11.842 12.006   
 (1.30) (5.22) (5.50) (5.50) (5.57)   
R
2 -0.106 
0.195 
0.049 
0.199 
0.400 
0.190 
0.245 
0.433 
0.166 
0.248 
0.461 
0.171 
0.241 
0.470 
0.164 
0.349 
0.511 
0.203 
# of Obs  103 89 86 83 83  83
(Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) 
(t) denotes the beginning date of each period – 1970-1980, 1980-89, 1989-98. 
(t, t+10) denotes the average computed between dates t and t+10. 
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Table 9 - SUR Estimates of the period-by-period (unconstrained) relationship 
(estimates allowed to differ across periods) 
 
 
  t=1970 t=1980 t=1989 
  SUR SUR SUR 
LRGDPCH(t) -1.430 -2.045 -1.625
 (3.08) (5.30) (2.81)
LIBER_SW_(t)  1.327 2.889 0.327
 (1.85) (4.79) (0.55)
POL   -0.847 -0.986 0.029
 (1.48) (1.89) (0.05)
SEC(t) -0.291 3.303 5.944
 (0.17) (2.24) (3.21)
PRI(t) 3.829 0.110 1.394
 (3.26) (0.09) (0.85)
CG(t, t+10)  -0.023 -0.036 -0.066
 (0.87) (1.36) (1.40)
REVOL(t, t+10)  -1.387 -1.014 -0.965
 (1.38) (1.11) (1.16)
ASSASS(t, t+10)  0.183 0.433 0.409
 (0.70) (1.40) (1.43)
PPIDEV(t) -0.072 0.423 -0.695
 (0.15) (1.14) (1.21)
INV(t, t+10)  0.071 0.080 0.033
 (2.07) (1.93) (0.67)
DENSI(t-10) 0.001 0.001 0.001
 (0.58) 1.35 1.71
Intercept 10.149 14.852 11.431
 (3.16) 5.21 2.79
R
2 0.410 0.584 0.285
# of Obs  83 83 83
(Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) 
(t) denotes the beginning date of each period – 1970-1980, 1980-89, 1989-98. 
(t, t+10) denotes the average computed between dates t and t+10. 
 
 
Table 10 - Summary Statistics for the variables used in fixed-effects regressions 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min Max 
Liberalization 7191 0.317 0.465 0.000  1.000
Investment Rate  5078 15.291 9.128 -3.590  52.880
Openness ratio  5078 60.505 42.880 3.110  473.860
Growth 4936 1.784 6.153 -48.732  43.754
Per capita GDP  5072 5739.380 5826.636 276.000  39129.000
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Table 11 - Fixed Effects Regressions of Growth on Liberalization Status, 1950-1998 
(specification of equation (1)) 
 
Dep. Var: Growth  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  1950-1998 1950-1970 1970-1990 1990-1998 
  Country Fixed Effects 
Liberalization  0.557 0.901 1.090 3.444 
  (2.26) (1.95) (1.72) (4.10) 
# of obs.  4936 1728 2312 1116 
# of countries  133 108 112 133 
R
2    0.015 0.010 0.034 0.035 
  Country Fixed Effects with Trend 
Liberalization  1.697 0.656 2.192 2.574 
  (6.11) (1.37) (3.38) (2.88) 
Year  -0.065 0.052 -0.143 0.206 
  (8.68) (1.97) (6.68) (2.76) 
# of obs.  4936 1728 2312 1116 
# of countries  133 108 112 133 
R
2   0.037  0.010  0.053 0.044 
  Country and Year Fixed Effects* 
Liberalization  1.417 0.611 1.787 2.547 
  (4.98) (1.29) (2.71) (2.85) 
# of obs.  4936 1728 2312 1116 
# of countries  133 108 112 133 
R
2    0.070 0.042 0.076 0.060 
(Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) 
* output for year dummies omitted. 
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Table 12 - Fixed Effects Regressions of the Investment Rate on Liberalization Status,  
1950-1998 (specification of equation (2)) 
 
Dep. Var: Investment rate  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  1950-1998 1950-1970 1970-1990 1990-1998 
  Country Fixed Effects 
Liberalization  1.233 3.026 -0.381 1.215 
  (6.62) (10.87) (0.94) (3.52) 
# of obs.  5078 1844 2321 1140 
# of countries  136 110 117 136 
R
2   0.142  0.141  0.235 0.114 
  Country Fixed Effects with Trend 
Liberalization  1.595 2.451 1.130 0.731 
  (7.56) (8.62) (2.84) (1.98) 
Year  -0.021 0.115 -0.196 0.114 
  (3.63) (7.59) (14.90) (3.60) 
# of obs.  5078 1844 2321 1140 
# of countries  136 110 117 136 
R
2    0.011 0.088 0.103 0.067 
  Country and Year Fixed Effects* 
Liberalization  1.937 2.545 1.237 0.762 
  (9.06) (8.92) (3.06) (2.05) 
# of obs.  5078 1844 2321 1140 
# of countries  136 110 117 136 
R
2   0.118  0.096  0.110 0.066 
(Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) 
* output for year dummies omitted. 
 
 
Table 13 – Fixed-Effects Regressions of Growth on the Investment Rate, 1950-1998 
 
Dep. Var.: Growth,   (1)  (2)  (3) 
1950-1998 Country  fixed 
effects 
Country fixed 
effects with trend 
Country and year 
fixed effects 
Investment rate  0.162 0.160  0.151
 (8.71) (8.63)  (8.05)
year -  -0.043  - 
 (6.45) 
# Obs.  4936 4936  4936
# Countries  133 133  133
R
2  0.052 0.087 0.061
(Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) 
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Table 14 - Fixed Effects Regressions of Openness (trade to GDP ratio) on Liberalization 
Status, 1950-1998 (specification of equation (3)) 
 
Dep.  Var:  Openness  (1) (2) (3) (5) 
  1950-1998 1950-1970 1970-1990 1990-1998 
  Country Fixed Effects 
Liberalization  14.844 2.834 6.475 4.149 
  (21.45) (3.42) (4.88) (2.40) 
# of obs.  5078 1844 2321 1140 
# of countries  136 110 117 136 
R
2    0.061 0.012 0.087 0.013 
  Country Fixed Effects with Trend 
Liberalization  5.176 2.396 2.295 -1.649 
  (7.09) (2.79) (1.73) (0.92) 
Year  0.549 0.087 0.542 1.370 
  (27.99) (1.92) (12.36) (8.89) 
# of obs.  5078 1844 2321 1140 
# of countries  136 110 117 136 
R
2    0.079 0.015 0.027 0.004 
  Country and Year Fixed Effects* 
Liberalization  5.531 2.302 4.097 -1.803 
  (7.42) (2.67) (3.12) (1.01) 
# of obs.  5078 1844 2321 1140 
# of countries  136 110 117 136 
R
2    0.083 0.013 0.045 0.005 
(Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) 
* output for year dummies omitted. 
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Table 15 - Timing of the Effects of Liberalization on Growth, Investment and Openness: 
Fixed-effects regressions (specification of Equation (4)) 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Dependent Variable: Growth 
D1 -1.629 -0.768 -0.555
 (3.56) (1.62) (1.16)
D2 -0.553 0.483 0.300
 (1.22) (1.01) (0.62)
D3 0.835 2.043 1.438
 (1.91) (4.32) (2.97)
D4 -0.482 1.487 1.015
 (1.33) (3.14) (2.13)
Year   -0.062
 (6.43)
# of obs.  4230 4230 4230
# of countries  118 118 118
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.06
  Dependent Variable: Investment Rate 
D1 -1.791 -1.607 -1.040
 (5.22) (4.49) (2.91)
D2 -0.858 -0.638 -0.160
 (2.52) (1.76) (0.44)
D3 0.739 0.996 1.197
 (2.25) (2.78) (3.31)
D4 1.984 2.399 2.129
 (7.35) (6.79) (6.07)
Year -0.013
 (1.82)
# of obs.  4357 4357 4357
# of countries  121 121 121
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.09
  Dependent Variable: Openness Ratio 
D1 4.678 -2.749 -1.979
 (3.65) (2.16) (1.54)
D2 8.438 -0.472 0.795
 (6.63) (0.37) (0.61)
D3 12.216 1.855 3.606
 (9.95) (1.46) (2.77)
D4 28.777 12.044 13.371
 (28.55) (9.58) (10.61)
Year 0.525
 (20.62)
# of obs.  4357 4357 4357
# of countries  121 121 121
R-squared 0.17 0.24 0.27
(Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses) 
Column (1): Country fixed-effects. Column (2): Country fixed-effects with a time trend; 
Column (3): Country and year fixed-effects.   74
Table 16 – Fixed Effects Regressions – Excluding the year of and the three years around 
liberalization 
 
Dep. Var: Growth, Excludes the year of liberalization  Excludes 3 years around liberalization
1950-1998 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) 
Liberalization 0.786 2.008 1.717 0.641 1.837 1.561
 (3.11) (7.07) (5.90) (2.35) (5.93) (4.90)
Year -  -0.069 -  -  -0.064 - 
   (9.14)    (8.00)  
# of obs.  4827 4827 4827 4558 4558 4558
# of countries  133 133 133 133 133 133
R
2 0.018 0.040 0.075 0.018 0.036 0.069
(Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) - Columns (3) and (6) include year fixed-effects. 
 
Table 17 – Sample splits between trade reformer, overall reformers and counteractor 
countries (1950-1998 period) 
 
Dep. Var: Growth 
1950-1998 
(1) (2) (3) 
  Country fixed effects Country fixed effects 
with trend 
Country and year 
fixed effects 
 Pooled  Sample 
Liberalization   0.906 1.690 1.585
 (2.58) (4.24) (3.45)
Year   -  -0.052 - 
 (4.04)   
# of obs.  959 959 959
# of countries  21 21 21
R
2 0.04 0.06 0.20
 Trade  Reformers 
Liberalization   1.241 1.863 1.672
 (1.80) (2.49) (1.80)
Year   -  -0.049 - 
 (2.04)
# of obs.  331 331 331
# of countries  7 7 7
R
2 0.04 0.06 0.26
 Overall  Reformers 
Liberalization   0.732 1.604 1.632
 (1.85) (3.47) (3.09)
Year   -  -0.054 - 
 (3.57) 
# of obs.  628 628 628
# of countries  14 14 14
R
2 0.03 0.05 0.23
(Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses) 
Trade Reformers: Bolivia, El Salvador, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay. 
Overall Reformers: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Paraguay, Poland, Spain, Sri Lanka.    75
Table 18 – Mean Growth, Investment and Openness Changes in 24 Countries 
 
country 
Growth 
Difference 
Investment 
Difference 
Openness 
difference 
year of 
liberalization 
Sample 
period 
Jordan -4.28  5.75 40.61 1965  1955-1998 
Guinea-Bissau -2.95 5.59 9.89 1987  1961-1998 
Hungary  -2.41 -1.19 -4.17 1990  1971-1998 
Mexico  -2.16 -4.59 17.56 1986  1951-1998 
Botswana  -1.99 3.98 22.27 1979  1961-1998 
Israel  -0.96 -6.10 21.42 1985  1951-1998 
Philippines  -0.40 1.03 39.54 1988  1951-1998 
Tunisia -0.30  -5.58 31.94 1989  1962-1998 
Colombia  0.18 0.48 5.91 1986  1951-1998 
Cyprus 0.34  -4.05 29.13 1960  1951-1996 
Paraguay 0.42  2.01 49.71 1989  1952-1998 
Poland  0.83 -4.30 3.35 1990  1971-1998 
Mali 1.19  0.86 15.68 1988  1961-1998 
Benin 1.74  1.64 8.72 1990  1960-1998 
Guyana 1.80  -7.49 84.49 1988  1951-1998 
Guinea 1.85  -2.74 7.28 1986  1960-1998 
Ghana  1.99 -3.91 9.13 1985  1956-1998 
Uganda  2.24 1.63 -6.60 1988  1951-1998 
Taiwan  2.29 9.91 55.77 1963  1952-1998 
Chile  2.80 -1.12 26.33 1976  1952-1998 
Korea, Rep. of  3.02 18.44 43.40 1968  1954-1998 
Uruguay 3.08  -1.01 11.22 1990  1951-1998 
Indonesia  3.32 9.80 25.96 1970  1961-1998 
Mauritius 3.62  0.34 35.90 1968  1951-1998 
Note: In bold, 13 country cases discussed in detail in subsection 5.2. Countries are 
entered in increaseing order of the growth difference. Figure 1 - Openness in the World (Sachs and Warner 
Criteria) - 141 countries.
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